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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 52 2007 NUMBER 4
THE IRRELEVANCE, AND CENTRAL RELEVANCE,
OF THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN SCIENCE
AND NON-SCIENCE IN THE EVALUATION
OF EXPERT WITNESS RELIABILITY.
D. MICHAEL RISINGER*
I.
Kick at the rock, Sam Johnson, break your bones:
But cloudy, cloudy, is the stuff of stones.
II.
We milk the cow of the world, and as we do
We whisper in her ear, "You are not true."
ICHARD Wilbur's little two-stanza poem is entitled "Epistemology,"'
J nd it nicely encapsulates the problem of knowledge. Extreme anti-
realist and relativist positions are not so easy to refute, but on the other
hand, actually believing them in any operational sense is, almost literally,
insane.
Caudill and LaRue's No Magic Wand2 is a breath of fresh air in the
difficult three-way relationship between "science studies,"3 science, and
the law. By rejecting the radical constructionist element of science studies
that has historically been its most public face, Caudill and LaRue have
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. I would like to thank
Larry Laudan for helpful comments and suggestions on the text, and Lesley
Chenoweth Risinger for insisting on clarity, analytically and editorially. The faults
and errors, alas, remain my own.
1. My copy is in THE NEW POETS OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA 325 (Donald Hall,
Robert Pack & Louis Simpson eds., 1957), a source that pretty well dates me too.
2. DAVID S. CAUDILL & LEWIS H. LARUE, No MAGIC WAND: THE IDEALIZATION
OF SCIENCE IN LAW (2006).
3. I have followed Caudill and LaRue's lead in using the umbrella designation
"science studies" to cover those schools of approach to the sociology of science
variously referred to as "science studies," "science and technology studies," "sociol-
ogy of scientific knowledge," and "social studies of science." The first three desig-
nations are referred to at CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 2, at xv, and the latter
phrase is the name of the leading journal in the field. The umbrella organization
for the area is called the Society for the Social Studies of Science (SSSS).
(679)
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cleared the way for science studies and its insights to play a constructive
role in the way law regards science.
4
I have just spoken of the difficult three-way relationship between sci-
ence studies, science, and the law. The existence of any relationship at all
may come as a surprise to most lawyers. I suspect that most lawyers, per-
haps even most legal academics, or even evidence scholars, have never
even heard of "science studies" as a specific discipline, or if they have, they
have only the vaguest notion of what it is. 5 I must admit that I was in the
same situation until just a few years ago. I had heard rumors of something
called the "science wars" involving critiques and defenses of the objectivity
of science. I formed the impression that the critiques were heavily influ-
enced by post-modernism, an approach to thought which generally makes
me break out in hives.6 With that in mind, I gave the science wars little
thought.
4. "Science is a product of both (i) observation and experiment, with respect
to natural reality, and (ii) norms, conventions, and expectations within the scien-
tific community." Id. "Oddly, however, while social constructivists do not idealize
science, they do idealize the social aspects of science to a degree that the successes
of science are either ignored or eclipsed." Id. at 3.
5. Thoroughly unscientific (assuming this designation has any meaning)
surveys undertaken by me have tended to confirm this. Enrolled members of the
science studies guild have been known to suspect the same thing. See Michael
Lynch & Simon Cole, Science and Technology Studies on Trial: Dilemmas of Expertise, 35
Soc. STUD. Sci. 269, 277 (2005).
6. By "post-modernism" I mean the hyper-relativist approach to knowledge
utilizing "deconstruction" as a methodology, under the influence of Jacques Der-
fida, Michel Foucault, and many others. See generally PAUL R. GROSS & NORMAN
LEVTr-, HIGHER SUPERSTITION-THE ACADEMIC LEF AND ITS QUARRELS WITH SCI-
ENCE 71-106 (1994). This school of thought, with its constant vamps on radical
skepticism, infected many parts of the academy like a plague from the 1970s
through the 1990s, most particularly literary studies, history, some forms of social
science and, to a certain degree, law, where critical legal studies in its worst ex-
cesses strangely coexisted with the often equally extreme versions of law and eco-
nomics perpetrated by the fight. Both had (and to a certain extent, continue to
have) a self-indulgent obscurantist style of exposition. The law and economics ob-
scurantism is often realized by feckless mathematization under circumstances
where no real numbers with any empirical value are ever likely to be available. The
obscurantism of Critical Legal Studies has been manifested through the adoption
of the syntactically tortured, jargon-fidden and unnecessarily verbose style of what
is asserted to be standard English that has marked much of post-modern writing in
many areas (the law not the least). These excesses of near-unintelligibility have
always seemed to me to be driven by three forces: the desire for a shared mysteri-
ous rhetoric to act as a badge of membership in the tribe (in essence a shibbo-
leth); an arrogance (on the part of some) reflecting the opinion that one is so
brilliant that first drafts will do, and that clarity is the job of the exegetes to come;
and, alternatively or concomitantly, a fear of what actual clarity of exposition might
reveal.
Such texts often remind me of the joke about the yeshiva student who went to
hear a traveling rebbe. Upon his return he was asked what he thought of the
rebbe, and he said, "He's a very smart rebbe, and I understood what he said." The
next week, the student again went to hear a different traveling rebbe. When he
returned he was again asked what he thought, and he replied, "He's a truly bril-
liant rebbe. I only understood half of what he said." The next week the student
[Vol. 52: p. 679
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My first formal introduction to science studies was probably in 2000,
when Ijoined David Caudill, among others, at a symposium at Washington
and Lee University on the Daubert trilogy and its implications. The contri-
bution to that symposium by Caudill and his co-author Richard Redding
was a lengthy article entitled Junk Philosophy of Science?: The Paradox of Exper-
tise and Interdisciplinarity in Federal Courts.7 It was from this article that I
first got an actual glimpse of the world of science studies and its construc-
tionist bent. I also discovered that its main target seemed to be an ex-
treme positivist view of science, in which the product of science was
entirely the function of external reality somehow channeled wholly
through the scientist as medium.8 I further learned that a main repository
of this view in the legal literature was the West treatise Modern Scientific
Evidence, to which I had contributed two chapters. 9 So perhaps my role
here is supposed to represent the wandless wizards of science implied by
the book's title and that of the symposium. If so, I will do my best both to
disappoint and not to disappoint such expectations.
I must admit that even after the 2000 conference I was still not too
inclined to expend a lot of time exploring the mysteries of science studies.
From what I somewhat apologetically admit was a rather cursory reading, I
still associated it with the dread "post-modernism." But I kept meeting
more people like David, whom I liked and respected and who seemed to
think there was something "there" in science studies, chief among them
Jennifer Mnookin and Simon Cole. So I did a little investigation. Proba-
again went to hear yet another traveling rebbe, and when asked what he thought
he declared enthusiastically, "He's the most brilliant rebbe in the world. I didn't
understand anything he said."
7. David S. Caudill & Richard E. Redding, junk Philosophy of Science?: The Para-
dox of Expertise and Interdisciplinarity in Federal Courts, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REX'. 685
(2000).
8. Caudill and Redding seem to adopt, at least as an analytic organizational
tool, Bruno Latour's four-category characterization of available positions on the
continuum between pure positivism and pure constructionism: (1) "radical," al-
lowing no role for external reality; (2) "progressivist," regarding science as domi-
nantly constructed but conceding that some exterior reality leaks in at various
points; (3) "conservative," regarding scientific knowledge as dominantly the prod-
uct of exterior reality while conceding some role for social influences; and (4)
.reactionary," regarding proper products of proper science as fully objective, de-
termined by the exterior world. See id. at 726-36, citing Bruno Latour, One More
Turn After the Social Turn, in THE SCI. STUD. READER 279 (Mario Biagioli ed.)
(1999). Latour claims to reject all these (though for what reason he does not say),
excoriating most particularly "the marsh of wishy washy scholars who add a little bit
of nature to a little bit of society and shun the two extremes." Though I have never
particularly aspired to be wishy washy, I am one of those middle grounders, as the
reader will see in due course. Apparently, so are Caudill and LaRue. See CAUDILL
& LARUE, supra note 2, at 4.
9. See CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 2, at 752 n.381. The treatise is DAVID L.
FAIGMAN, DAVID H. KAYE, MICHAEL J. SAKS & JOSEPH SANDERS, MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE-THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (3d ed. 2005-2006). My
chapters are chapter 1 ("A Functional Taxonomy of Expertise") and chapter 35
("Handwriting Identification").
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bly not enough to actually justify what I am going to say, but this is a sym-
posium and I have the conch, so I am going to say it anyway.
It seems to me that science studies in its various manifestations have
suffered from a self-inflicted wound. It has made itself easy to associate
with the worst excesses of post-modernism as post-modernism played out
across various academic disciplines. In the main, perhaps science studies
practitioners did not go so far in that direction as their critics later
charged, at least not consistently. But if they were not card carrying post-
modernists, they were at least sometimes opportunistic fellow travelers,
and there was still plenty of excessive rhetoric to choose from, collections
of which have been made in various places by Larry Laudan,' 0 Susan
Haack,' and Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, 12 among others. Defenders
of science studies sometimes respond that such quotations do not re-.
present the field or that they were taken out of context.13 However, there
has rarely been any clear repudiation of that rhetoric.
The main bones of contention concern a constellation of intercon-
nected issues that really are not, or do not have to be, central to science
studies as a discipline, 14 but seem to have became central to its identity:
First, the existence vel non of any reality external to the senses of human
observers; second, the role of such external reality (if any) in the products
of the enterprise of science; third, whether there is anything special about
the methods of science as a human activity; and fourth, whether science
can be properly characterized as marked by progress. It may be helpful to
set out two polar extremes of response to these questions, which we will
call the heroic positivist response and the extreme post-modernist
response.
10. See LARRY LAUDAN, SCIENCE AND RELATIVISM 55 n.7 (1990) (quoting David
Bloor and Barry Barnes); id. at 74 (characterizing positions of Bloor and Harry
Collins); id. at 106 (quoting Bloor and Barnes's definition of knowledge as "any
collectively accepted system of beliefs").
11. SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE-WITHIN REASON 21 (2003) (quoting,
among other things, Harry Collins's infamous statement that "the natural world
has a small or non-existent role in the construction of scientific knowledge").
There are numerous other quotations from Barnes, Bloor, Collins, Bruno Latour
and Steve Woolgar throughout the book, most particularly in chapter 7, "A Modest
Proposal-The Sensible Program in Sociology of Science" and its accompanying
notes. Id. at 179-205.
12. See Alan Sokal &Jean Bricmont, Science and the Sociology of Science: Beyond
War and Peace, in THE ONE CULTURE?-A CONVERSATION ABOUT SCIENCE 27-28 (ay
A. Labinger & Harry Collins eds.) (quoting Collins, Latour, Barnes and Bloor, and
Stanley Aronowitz). See generally ALAN SoK.A &JEAN BRIGMONT, FASHIONABLE NON-
SENSE-POSTMODERN INTELLECTUALS' ABUSE OF SCIENCE (1998).
13. See, e.g., Michael Lynch, Is a Science Peace Process Necessary? in THE ONE CUL-
TURE?-A CONVERSATION ABOUT SCIENCE, supra note 12, at 50-52. See also Harry M.
Collins & Robert Evans, The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and
Experience, 32 Soc. STUD. OF Sci. 235, 236 (2003).
14. See Susan Haack's "sensible program" for the sociology of science in
HAACK, supra note 11, at 194-201.
[Vol. 52: p. 679682
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The heroic positivist' 5 would say that there is external reality, that
science has a special methodology that, when properly applied, allows a
practitioner to discover new details of the contours of that external reality
and the regularities that define it; that it is the external world of reality
that accounts for and is reflected in the products of science (and thus they
are "objective"); and that science is both cumulative and progressive, in
that old knowledge is built on and built up toward an understanding that
is better than yesterday (and not as good as tomorrow), leading ultimately
to a perhaps distant but realizable Laplacian 16 full account of the world
accessible to the senses.
The extreme post-modern position would be that there may be no
external reality; that even if there is, that science has no special way of
getting at it; that the products of science are dominantly social construc-
tions to which external reality (if any) contributes very little if anything;
and that since the products of science are only valid in and for the human
communities that construct them, they are neither objective nor progres-
sive. Science, in short, is just another human game like the construction
of mythology in ancient Greece. Ultimately, everything reduces to (un-
scientific) psychology, politics and power.
Critics of science studies (often, but not exclusively, practicing scien-
tists) accuse science studies people of largely buying into the
postmodernist viewpoint. 17 Science studies people deny this and accuse
15. I have at another place characterized this view as "pathological positiv-
ism." See D. Michael Risinger, Boxes in Boxes: Julian Barnes, Conan Doyle, Sherlock
Holmes and the Edaiji Case, 4 INT'L COMMENT. ON EVIDENCE, Iss. 2, Art. 3 at 9, availa-
ble at http://www.bepress.com/ice/vol4/-iss2/art3. I refer to it as "heroic positivism"
here to emphasize its conceptual reliance on an image of a single heroic thinker as
the operative unit in science. It is an extreme version of what Professor Haack
refers to as the "Old Deferentialist" view of science. See HAACK, supra note 11, at
31-51. It seems to correspond closely with Latour's "Reactionary." See Latour,
supra note 8.
16. The main contribution of Pierre-Simon Laplace (ironically the greatest
probability theorist of the early 19th-century) to nineteenth century positivism was
the notion that if one attained sufficiently detailed knowledge of the facts concern-
ing a phenomenon, notions of probability and prediction would disappear be-
cause all of the past and the future would be entailed in the present knowledge.
We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past
and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would
know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of
which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to sub-
mit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the move-
ments of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom;
for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like
the past would be present before its eyes.
PIERRE-SIMON LAPLACE, EssAI PHILOSOPHIQUE SUR LES PROBABILITPS (1814).
17. See GROSS & LEVITT, supra note 6, at 42-70; see also STEVEN WEINBERG,
FACING UP-SCIENCE AND ITS CULTURAL ADVERSARIES (2001). Gross is a biologist,
Levitt is a mathematician; Weinberg (and the previously referenced Sokal and
Bricmont, supra note 12) are theoretical physicists. Laudan, supra note 10, is a
philosopher of science and Haack, supra note 11, is an epistemologist. For an
excellent, detailed and carefully critical intellectual history of the post-WW II tech-
5
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the practicing scientists of merely trying to defend a version of heroic posi-
tivism that the various examinations undertaken by science studies people
have rendered untenable.1 8 They further say that their relativism is not
"cognitive" or "radical" or "philosophical" relativism, but merely "method-
ological" relativism-an approach to description and analysis of scientific
disputes that puts aside any judgment based upon the ultimate epistemic
merits of the positions of the various sides.'" Only in this way, they say,
can one avoid post-hoc "heroic" or "whig" history,20 where the contribu-
tions of social factors to the performances of only the losing side are up
for discussion (e.g., "why in the world did those losers take that position in
the face of all this evidence"). The critics of science studies respond that
methodological relativism was a late-arrived-at stop-gap cover for a more
fundamental relativism, and in addition, that even methodological relativ-
ism makes it impossible to examine properly how much the final outcome
of the process of science is in fact the product of the phenomenon under
examination, and not merely an exercise in social construction like the
generation of mythic origin stories in traditional cultures. 2 1
There is evidence that the two sides in the "science wars" are finding
some common ground. As it turns out (though this should hardly be sur-
prising), there are very few if any practicing scientists of any repute (and
fewer philosophers of science) 22 who subscribe to an heroic positivist view
of science, with its emphasis on a model of individual inquiry and its
strong assumption that ultimate truth is, at least in theory, directly knowa-
nical controversies in the philosophy of science that have driven these debates, as
those controversies bled into the wider intellectual community, see generallyJOHN
H. ZAMMITO, A NICE DERANGEMENT OF EPISTEMES: POsT-POSITIVISM IN THE STUDY OF
SCIENCE FROM QUINE TO LATOUR (2004).
18. See Trevor Pinch, Does Science Studies Undermine Science?-Wittgenstein, Tur-
ing and Polanyi as Precursors for Science Studies and the Science Wars, in THE ONE CUL-
TURE?-A CONVERSATION ABOUT SCIENCE, supra note 12, at 21-22.
19. See Harry Collins, One More Round with Relativism, in THE ONE CULTURE?-
A CONVERSATION ABOUT SCIENCE, supra note 12, at 186-90.
20. Wikipedia describes "whig" history as:
[A] pejorative name given to a view of history that interprets history as a
story of Teleological progress toward the present. The phrase was coined
by the British historian Herbert Butterfield in 1931, in his small but influ-
ential book The Whig Interpretation of History. It takes its name from
the British Whigs, advocates of the power of Parliament, who opposed the
Tories, advocates of the power of the King and the aristocracy. The term
has been applied in historical disciplines outside of British history (the
history of science, for example) to criticize any goal-directed, hero-based,
and trans-historical narratives.
See Wikipedia.com, Whig History, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whig-history (last
visited Apr. 6, 2007). Though it must be approached with some caution, I am in
awe at the general success of the Wikipedia project, which I would not have myself
predicted.
21. See Sokal & Bricmont, supra note 12, at 38-43. Jean Bricmont & Alan
Sokal, Reply to Our Critics, in THE ONE CULTURE?-A CONVERSATION ABOUT SCIENCE,
supra note 12, at 243-49.
22. See LAUDAN, supra note 10, at 149; see also HAACK, supra note 11, at 22.
[Vol. 52: p. 679
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ble. This heroic positivist view (which I refer to as the "Sherlock Holmes"
notion of science), 23 was never particularly tenable, but it did appeal to a
certain Victorian sensibility. It died among thoughtful scientists (to the
extent it ever lived among them) in the early 20th century with the coming
of relativity theory, quantum mechanics, the Heisenberg principle, proba-
bilistic models of multiple causation and expansion of the size of teams
required to do serious research in many areas. 24 (It was a scientist, after
all,J.B.S. Haldane, who gave rise to "Haldane's Law," that the world is not
only stranger than we know, it is stranger than we can know.)2 5 Everyone
of any reflection and familiarity with actually "doing science" will concede
that normal science practice includes much that is social, and much that is
an exercise in "construction." 26 Indeed, these themes were present in the
pre-"science studies" sociology of science represented by Robert K.
Merton, 2 7 a figure science studies people often seem to look down upon
as representing a somehow outmoded "First Wave."
28
None of this means that the "Sherlock Holmes" vision of heroic posi-
tivism doesn't live on. It certainly does, and to a very great extent, among
23. See Risinger, supra note 15. This is hardly the place to attempt an intellec-
tual history of 19th-century positivism. Suffice it to say that its single most influen-
tial voice was Auguste Comte, see ZAMMITO supra note 17, at 6-8, and that it was
marked by the notion that all knowledge was reducible to factual propositions ac-
cessible to science, that existence in all its manifestations was marked by progress,
and that expert practitioners of a generalized "scientific" approach in virtually all
spheres of knowledge would discover perfect truths that would in turn dictate so-
cial goals and means leading to progress. See Nicola Abbagnano, Positivism, in 6
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 414 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967). It is easy to see
how such a set of notions would appeal in an age of colonialist expansion and
industrial progress. It was the dominant popular notion of science among the
literate in the formative period in which the law encountered "forensic science,"
and in a fairly unreflective way it continues to be a common though distorting lens
through which a wide range of people view "science."
24. In fact, heroic positivism began dying among serious thinkers about sci-
ence during the same period it seemed to embed itself in popular culture (appar-
ently because of the dramatically visible triumphs of science, especially applied
science). For an introduction to the history of the shift to probabilism and fallibil-
ism among scientists in the 19th century, see LARRY LAUDAN, SCIENCE AND HYPOTHE-
SS (1981).
25. "My own suspicion is that the Universe is not only queerer than we sup-
pose, but queerer than we can suppose." J.B.S. HALDANE, POSSIBLE WORLDS (1927),
quoted in Columbia World of Quotations. Consider also the following from Lewis
Thomas: "The only solid piece of scientific truth about which I feel totally confi-
dent is that we are profoundly ignorant about nature.... It is this sudden con-
frontation with the depth and scope of ignorance that represents the most
significant contribution of twentieth-century science to the human intellect."
LEwIS THOMAS, THE MEDUSA AND THE SNAIL 73-74 (1973).
26. "We are all, in a commonsensical way, cultural constructionists in our view
of science." GROSS & LEVITr, supra note 6, at 43 (describing "weak form" of cultural
construction ism).
27. See, e.g., ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE (1973).
28. See Collins & Evans, supra note 13, at 239. Collins and Evans dispose of
the "first wave" (which they assert had "crashed on the shore" by early 1970s) in a
single paragraph without mentioning Merton.
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the public at large, and in the legal community also, lawyers and judges
alike. 29 And as Caudill and LaRue properly point out, it can have perni-
cious consequences sometimes, 30 but the science community and the sci-
ence studies community ought to be allies in attacking these.
Science studies proponents, on the other hand, seem to be (some-
times somewhat grudgingly) admitting that an assumption of external re-
ality is (in reality) the only game in town and that science has a strong
claim that it is progressive in some sense, mainly springing from its own
obviously increased predictive power over the decades, and from the re-
lated increased success of applied science in controlling aspects of the ex-
ternal world.31 So the continued debate seems to be, in the long run,
mainly over the proper proportion to be accorded to social construction
factors in comparison to the external phenomena under examination,
and, in the short run, over the usefulness of "methodological relativism."
Perhaps we can bring this into some focus by examining a model Sci-
ence Studies case study as an illustration. I have selected my friend Simon
Cole's work, beginning with his analysis of the petroleum origin debate,
for it was in the "science studies" framework that Professor Cole was
trained at Cornell and his article "Which Came First, the Fossil or the Fuel?'32
is an excellent example of the kind of study this approach can generate at
its best. Professor Cole noticed/discovered a classic circumstance of the
kind that Science Studies feeds on: There is a generally accepted theoreti-
cal account of a physical phenomenon (in this case, that petroleum prod-
ucts are the product of geological forces transforming fossil remains). 33
This account is generated by and made the subject of further research by a
sub-category of scientists (geologists, specifically, petroleum geologists). A
brilliant maverick from outside the proprietor group (in this case Thomas
Gold, a person with credentials that makes him difficult to ignore) 3 4 chal-
lenges the theory with a different theory that may be just as good and in
some ways superior from the perspective of the claimed general principles
of science (data coverage, parsimony, etc.). (In this case, the alternative is
that all or most oil and gas are the product of "out-gassing" from the
29. The success of television shows like the various "CSI" iterations shows that
heroic positivist views of science are alive and well among the masses.
30. See CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 2, at 3-4, 15-47 (chapter 2: "Judges Who
Are Too Strict" and chapter 3: "Judges Who Are Too Gullible").
31. See Laudan, supra note 10, at 2-32. See generally, JOHN LOSEE, THEORIES OF
SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS: AN INTRODUCTION (2004).
32. Simon A. Cole, Which Came First, the Fossil or the Fuel?, 26 Soc. STUD. SCI.
733 (1996).
33. Id. This hypothesis is called biogenesis. The opposing hypothesis is abio-
genesis (explaining the origin of oil, gas and coal solely through physical and
chemical processes within the Earth).
34. Thomas Gold is a member of the National Academy of Sciences and a
Fellow of the Royal Society, with significant contributions to his credit in a variety
of physics and astronomy subdisciplines. Id. at 736-37.
686 [Vol. 52: p. 679
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Earth's mantle).1 5 Controversy ensues, coupled with various predictable
and "unscientific" human reactions. In the end, however, the article con-
cludes where science studies articles are expected to conclude-the alter-
native hypotheses appear to be equally tenable (or perhaps the maverick is
a bit favored rhetorically as the underdog), the hegemony of the standard
theory remains unshaken, textbooks stay the same and science in this in-
stantiation looks more like small town politics than a lordly engine of sure
and objective truth. Professor Cole maintains a coolly objective stance to
the end. There is perhaps a bit of obligatory constructivist rhetoric, but
there are no explicit screeds making "strong programme" 36 points. The
facts as set out are generally allowed to speak for themselves, but the sub-
ject selected makes the "science studies" point by itself sufficiently for it to
be selected for summary and comment by that guru of science studies,
Harry Collins and his co-author Trevor Pinch in The Golem at Large-What
You Should Know About Technology.
37
Notice a number of things. First, the controversy, in general terms,
concerns an important but small piece of geological science. Second, it is
examined over the course of a relatively short period of time. No doubt
numerous such stories could be told in selected decades in regard to con-
tinental drift, for instance. 38 This does not mean that one should con-
clude that the theory of plate tectonics has not given us a better
understanding of the phenomenon of continental drift (vel non) than was
the case half a century ago. 39 Progress emerges out of individual messy
controversies over time. I am not claiming such progress is inevitable in
the individual case. In regard to the petroleum origins debate, as in any
individual case, the controversy may be abandoned or go unresolved for
lack of sufficient interest, or lack of funds to do the expensive research
that might resolve the issue. But just because not every problem raised is
35. Gold basically resuscitated the theory of abiogenesis, which had been a
competing theory through the 19th and early 20th centuries, when it faded in the
1920s. Id. at 756-57.
36. "The Strong Programme" (British spelling intentionally retained) is the
name of the strongly relativistic approach to the sociology of science originally set
out by David Bloor of the University of Edinburgh in DAVID BLOOR, KNOWLEDGE
AND SOCIAL IMAGERY (1976).
37. HARRY COLLINS & TREVOR PINCH, THE GOLEM AT LARGE: WHAT You
SHOULD KNOW ABOUT TECHNOLOGY 76-92 (1998).
38. Cole makes use of the analogy to the tides of opinion concerning conti-
nental drift. See Cole, supra note 32, at 737.
39. "Many theories of the past, so far as we can tell, were both genuinely refer-
ring and empirically successful, but we are nonetheless loath to regard them as
approximately true. Consider, for instance, virtually all those geological theories
prior to the 1960's which denied any lateral motion to the continents. Such theo-
ries were, by any standard, highly successful (and apparently referential); but
would anyone be prepared to say that their constituent theoretical claims-com-
mitted as they were to laterally stable continents-are almost true?"
LARRY LAUDAN, SCIENCE AND VALUES 123 (1984) (commenting on the problems of
realist correspondence or approximate correspondence theories of truth in
science).
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solved and not every issue is subject to progressive resolution, does not
mean that there are not other controversies, perhaps even the majority,
that lead to progressive resolution.
Third, Professor Cole maintains strict "methodological relativism" '40
in this article. He makes no authorial observations concerning the relative
merits of the competing theories. In a study of an ongoing scientific con-
troversy with qualified participants and no obvious external interests in-
volved, this is completely defensible, but such a stance can easily reinforce
the notion that evidence (and the external reality that lies behind evi-
dence) is irrelevant to the ultimate resolution of controversies, even while
the stance aids understanding the realities of scientific practice on the
ground in the individual case studied.
And so Professor Cole's career might have proceeded, had he not
encountered fingerprints. I think it likely, when he first encountered the
odd status of the claims to "scientific" knowledge that lay behind finger-
print identification, that he hoped and trusted it would be another cir-
cumstance where warring claims to the mantle of science would be
interesting to explore in themselves, and would result in the end in the
predicted (and desired) science studies denouement-the controversy is
unresolved because there is no more to be said on the one side than on
the other, although the "establishment" view prevails in the end for politi-
cal or proprietary reasons that can be met with a sophisticated shrug. It is
a good thing for all of us that in the end it did not work out that way.
Professor Cole first discovered fingerprints as long ago as 1995, and it
was the subject of a number of conference presentations that, judging by
their titles, appeared to assume that the claims of the fingerprint identifi-
cation community, while of course challengeable, were at least as valid as
any other claims to "scientific" knowledge. 41 Nonetheless, there appears
to have been something in the critical reflection necessary for the shaping
of his magnum opus, the prizewinning book Suspect Identities,4 2 that caused
the growing suspicion evident in sections of that book that the claims of
practitioners of fingerprint identification to scientific knowledge-or
knowledge of any sort in regard to their more extreme claims-was insup-
portable not merely in the same sense that the science studies "strong pro-
gramme" may assume that all claims are ultimately insupportable, but
insupportable in a more fundamental and important way.
40. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, Address at the Cornell University "Doing Is Believ-
ing" Conference: There is Something to This Science: Establishing the Credibility
of Fingerprinting in the United States (Apr. 23, 1995); Simon A. Cole, Address at
The Society for the Social Studies of the Science: Society for the History of Tech-
nology Annual Meeting, Charlottesville, Va.: Trying Dactyloscopy: The Mechaniza-
tion of Truth in the Courtroom (Oct. 19, 1995).
42. SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES (2001). SUSPECT IDENTITIES is a beau-
tifully written book, which among other things instantly replaced all previous
works as the standard history of fingerprint identification in particular and foren-
sic identification in general.
[Vol. 52: p. 679688
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From that point on, Professor Cole's scholarship has become increas-
ingly critical in the best sense, pointing out the weaknesses in the standard
accounts of why we should accept the validity of crime scene fingerprint
identification, and exploding the myth of infallibility that has surrounded
such identification for nearly a century. Consider the following:
The chief problem with this conceptual framework is that it
offers no opportunity for assessment. Fingerprinting has con-
structed a perfect rhetorical system, in which the actual accuracy
of the technique is irrelevant. Consider this: a forensic technique
for which no measurement is made of examiner accuracy; no
match standards are set; little effective regulation is in place; little
scrutiny is exercised by other actors in the criminal justice system;
all expertise resides in law enforcement; is legally untouchable;
and is popularly regarded as "science." Such a technique might
be highly accurate, or it might not be. It actually makes little dif-
ference, and we have no way of knowing which state of affairs is
in place. Even if fingerprint identification itself is highly accurate
and fingerprint examiners are highly ethical, other techniques
and other analysts can adopt the same framework with equal fa-
cility. The framework functions just as well for inaccurate tech-
niques as it does for accurate techniques. Within this conceptual
framework, we have no way of sorting accurate techniques from
the inaccurate, or competent analysts from incompetent, other
than the occasional forensic scandal or miscarriage of justice,
which is the tip of the iceberg that tells us we have a lurking
problem.
When I suggest applying the overheated political term "junk
science" to forensic fingerprint identification, I mean something
different than what one might assume at first glance. By 'junk
science" I do not necessarily imply that forensic fingerprint ex-
aminers routinely produce incorrect results or miscarriages of
justice. Certainly, they do produce these things; but how much,
we can only guess. Rather, I suggest that the conceptual frame-
work in which fingerprint examiners operate is 'junk science." In
particular, the way in which fingerprint examiners vouch for
their knowledge is 'junk." Fingerprint examiners may or may not
be highly accurate, but in either case backing up testimony by
reference to "one hundred years of experience," "the authority
of forty judges," "one hundred years of adversarial testing," or
"professional judgment based on training and experience" is, to
put it colloquially, 'junk science." It is not thoughtful, it is not
rigorous, and it is not-whatever the term may ultimately
mean-scientific. 4 3
43. Simon A. Cole, Fingerprinting: The First Junk Science?, 28 OKLA. Crry U.L.
REv. 73, 90-91 (2003).
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Not much "methodological relativism" here. But instead of going to
the other extreme, and demanding the kind of statistically determinate
data that characterizes DNA identification before we accept the validity of
any identification by fingerprint matching, Professor Cole has concen-
trated on the real problems, which (conceding that there may be enough
randomness in fingerprint patterns to be confident of a ten-print match
from two sets of rolled prints) include inter alia: first, the insupportable
concept of "zero methodological error rate";44 second, the existence of
more errors than the myths of infallibility would suggest; 45 third, the ne-
cessity of approaching error rates, not globally, but specifically for the po-
tentially more difficult subtasks that result when latent prints are small in
extent and unclear in detail; 46 fourth, the fact that no work has been done
making it clear when the threshold of reliability is reached as to the extent
and clarity of the available latent print go down to the point commonly
encountered with crime scene prints; 47 and fifth, the use of case experi-
ence as self-justifying information of accurate practice. 48 Professor Cole
has thus moved beyond "methodological relativism," whatever its uses may
sometimes be, with a realization that when claims invoke the mantle of
science without meeting the standards of science, they are not just differ-
ent approaches to knowledge of the material world-they are often infer-
ior in their epistemic status. 49 Science (whatever it is) is really onto
something when it comes to valid and reliable approaches to truth about
the material world. It is, in Professor Haack's memorable terms, not "priv-
ileged" but "distinguished. '50
None of this is to say that every fact of interest to the law is the subject
of scientific knowledge. This is especially true in regard to trials, as op-
posed to the factual components of policy judgments that lie behind law-
making exercises. The facts relevant to policy are closer to the theoretic
generalities which are the main hoped-for product of science per se. The
facts of a particular case are often of the everyday type about which no
particular expertise is needed to inquire into them, and even if expertise
44. See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accountingfor Error in Latent Finger-
print Identification, 96 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 1038-43 (2005).
45. See id. at 996-1023.
46. See id. at n.23.
47. See id.; see also Simon A. Cole, Does "Yes" Really Mean Yes?: The Attempt to
Close Debate on the Admissibility of Fingerprint Testimony, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 449, 463
(2005) ("Courts have yet to grapple with the lack of scientific studies testing latent
print examiners' ability to do what they claim to be able to do.").
48. See Simon A. Cole, "Implicit Testing": Can Casework Validate Forensic Tech-
niques ?, 46 JURIMETICS J. 117 (2006).
49. Often, not always. Not all claims to reliable knowledge about the material
world invoke the mantle of science, and many may be of high epistemic quality.
See, e.g., infra note 69 (discussing value of "mere empiricks"); see also infra notes 51,
78, 85 and 121.
50. HAAcK, supra note 11, at 94-95.
[Vol. 52: p. 679
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was needed, no science properly conceived (about which more later, of
course) would have anything useful to say, at least currently.5'
I have just used the words "science" and "expertise," and here we
come to the point where I must begin to deliver on the first part of the
rather paradoxical title to this article, the part that says that the demarca-
tion problem (the problem of drawing a reasonably determinate line be-
tween science and non-science as modes of inquiry and knowledge
generation, and thus between knowledge claims that are the product of
science and those that are not) is irrelevant in developing approaches for
evaluating the reliability of expertise proffered in court. What I mean by
this is that the line between science and non-science is initially not particu-
larly helpful in analyzing or organizing the phenomenon of claimed ex-
pertise as it exists in the legal setting. Such analysis and organization
should come before addressing any questions about where "scientific" ex-
pertise fits in, or how it should be handled in comparison to other claims
of expertise. Indeed, it is my contention that the label "science," with its
inevitable honorific connotations, simply gets in the way in regard to the
enterprise of developing a defensible taxonomy of expertise in the legal
setting.
I have made some detailed observations concerning such a taxon-
omy,52 and indeed, those thoughts in their current iteration were what I
placed in the materials distributed to the continuing legal education par-
ticipants in this symposium. I will not reproduce those in toto here, but a
summary is necessary to make my point about the irrelevance of "science"
to the undertaking.
My first claim is that one can only begin to get a handle on the notion
of expertise by looking carefully at what is concededly non-expert testi-
mony-the testimony of ordinary fact witnesses. What we want from a fact
witness is testimony about concrete details concerning the episode that
gave rise to the controversy before the court, what we can profitably call
"adjudicative facts." Fact witnesses are defined by their interchangeability
with jurors-the only informational advantage we can ascribe to a fact wit-
ness over a juror is that the witness was someplace at a time the juror was
51. Not all rational empirical inquiry is part of science in the modern sense.
There was, of course, a pre-modern use of the term which was applied to any or-
ganized attempt at knowledge. This usage lives on in such terms as "military sci-
ence" and "library science." Professor Haack quite rightly regards science as
continuous with good practices of empirical inquiry in other areas from history to
crime detection to everyday life, an approach she labels "critical common-sensism."
HAACK, supra note 11, at 23-29. Indeed, the products of such inquiry may be as
well warranted in their sphere as the product of science narrowly defined, which is
a good thing, since bringing real science to bear on many issues of importance to
the law would be practically impossible.
52. These reflections originally appeared in D. Michael Risinger, Preliminary
Thoughts on a Functional Taxonomy of Expertise for the Post-Kumho World, 31 SETON
HALL L. REv. 508 (2000). They now appear in a refined version as D. Michael
Risinger, A Functional Taxonomy of Expertise, in FAiCMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 87
[hereinafter Functional Taxonomy].
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not, and thus had direct perceptual access to information that the juror
did not have. Notionally, if their positions of time and space were re-
versed, the juror would become a proper witness and the witness a proper
juror. In this sense they are interchangeable. Expertise exists when a wit-
ness has some advantage over the average juror more than merely the ad-
vantage of time and place in regard to a factual detail of the episode
under examination. But what might such an advantage be that will allow
witness assertions beyond what is allowable for a fact witness?
Here, I adhere to a great functional divide that is sometimes recog-
nized in the literature, the divide between education of the jury as an ex-
pert function, and translation of information as an expert function. When
a witness performs the first (educational) expert function, the witness is
informing the jury of general information that the average juror could not
be expected to know. In general, the witness who educates is also summa-
rizing a great deal of foundational information for the efficient education
of the jury, which is why I have also styled such witnesses "summariza-
tional" experts. 53 The information provided from such "expertise" must
be rationally usable by the jury to supplement, qualify or correct such labo-
ratory of life generalities about the workings of the world that otherwise
comprise the "common sense" that the jurors are supposed to use in evalu-
ating the meaning and implications of the "adjudicative fact" evidence of
ordinary fact witnesses and other sources of information produced at trial.
When a witness performs the second (translational) expert function,
the witness is taking raw information and translating it from its raw form
to a form more usable by the jury. In terms I find congenial, the expert
takes potentially relevant information with little or no usable relevance
from the perspective of the ordinary person (the juror), and translates the
information into a usably relevant form using what the witness claims is a
reliable system of translation.
The fundamental problem with proffered expertise is that of insuring
that every expert assertion carries with it a proper rational belief warrant.
It is this that is at the heart of any defensible notion of the judge's role as
gatekeeper. Different forms of expertise are amenable to different forms
of belief warrant and demand different approaches to what constitutes a
proper belief warrant. In addition, different functional contexts may ap-
propriately be said to allow weaker belief warrants or demand stronger
belief warrants. In the case of educational expert testimony, we may use-
53. I have generally used the term "summarizational" to emphasize the way in
which the witness processes the information that lies behind the testimony. On
those rare occasions when such witnesses are explicitly recognized, they are usually
referred to as "educational" experts, and that is likely to remain the common term.
See generally RonaldJ. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts:
Deference or Education ?, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1131 (1993); RonaldJ. Allen & Joseph S.
Miller, The Expert as Educator: Enhancing the Rationality of Verdicts in Child Sex Abuse
Prosecutions, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 323 (1995).
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fully divide such testimony again into two domains, everyday summariza-
tion and technical summarization.
Everyday summarizational expertise is the testimony we label "expert"
that is closest to fact witness testimony. The example I usually use involves
a case under the Uniform Commercial Code in which the proper con-
struction of a contract turns on industry practice in the wholesale shoe
business:
A witness is called who has been in the wholesale shoe busi-
ness for thirty-five years. He will universally be declared an ex-
pert and his testimony will generally be characterized as "expert
testimony." However, to the extent he merely recounts the con-
tours of practice in the shoe industry as he knows them to be
from his experience, how does his testimony differ from that of
the ordinary fact witness? He is not necessarily possessed of any
relevant skills or talents beyond the members of the jury. There
is no reason to believe that if any of them had been where he has
been and perceived what he has perceived, that they would not
in the ordinary course know what he knows. He seems to have
nothing more than a space-time advantage over the jurors, no
different than a fact witness.
There is an important difference, however, in the desired
testimonial function of the ordinary fact witness and that of the
shoe man. We want the ordinary fact witn-.%s to traffic in empiri-
cal specifics. In addition, we want those specifics expressed in
the most concrete fashion practicable. When fact witnesses begin
to express themselves in more inferential terms, summarizing a
number of specific percepts with an umbrella inference such as
the word "drunk" or the word "angry," fights start to break out in
the courtroom over the propriety of the terms in which the wit-
ness is testifying. We need not tarry at length over the unhelpful
terms in which those battles are often waged. Suffice it to say
that the general principles which should guide the judge in con-
trolling the manner of expression of fact witnesses are reasonably
agreed upon: (1) No inferences beyond the capacity of the wit-
ness; (2) Even if inferentially conclusory testimony is within ordi-
nary capacity to accurately render, require more concrete
testimony and leave the inference to the jury unless; (a) the in-
ference is based upon subliminal percepts not fairly reproduced
in testimony: or (b) unless trying to explain to the witness what is
desired will confuse the witness and result in a net loss of de-
pendable relevant information.
In the case of the shoe man, such an approach would defeat
the whole purpose of his testimony. He is there to give precisely
the kind of summary we would not want from the ordinary fact
witness, in order to educate the jury about the practices of the
693
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shoe industry as efficiently as possible consistent with giving accu-
rate information. This summary is derived from a data base of
many particular and concrete observations over a long period of
time. Much of this is now beyond specific recall, but we assume
that, as a person who remained long in business, his resultant
impressions and conclusions are in general accurately weighted
conclusions based on the totality of his experience. If we were to
require him to testify in more concrete terms, his testimony
would become a series of anecdotes which would not necessarily
represent a proper sample of his whole experience. We want
him to perform what can profitably be labeled the "summariza-
tional function," and because ordinary fact witnesses are debar-
red from it, the price of admission for the shoe man is to label
him something other than a fact witness. Traditionally, there is
only one other label available, so he is declared an expert, which
is taken to authorize the summarizational form of his testimony.
To this point, our model of the summarizational expert has
been our shoe man, and there has been an assumption that most
or all of the knowledge which goes into his summary testimony is
knowledge derived from his direct personal experience. This
may be the case in a given situation, and it is this direct personal
experience summarizational expert function which is concep-
tually closest to the fact witness function. But in reality, a real
shoe man might derive much of his information about the work-
ings of the industry from secondary sources, such as industry
meetings, networks of friends, and so forth. He may also have
read industry publications of various sorts. In this case the shoe
man's testimony will be a summary result not only of his direct
personal experience, but of these secondary hearsay sources as
well. We could hardly do otherwise and allow him to testify at all,
because he himself could not say with confidence which parts of
his knowledge were based on personal experience and which on
secondary information. But we assume that his first-hand experi-
ence has enabled him in various ways to evaluate and internalize
the secondary information, with reasonable reliability inhering in
the resultant summary. Our tolerance for this hearsay element,
and our reliance on the witness as filter of it, is a second way in
which a summarizational expert differs from the ordinary fact
witness. 54
Everyday summarizational expertise offered to educate the jury is per-
haps the easiest expertise for the jury to deal with because it is closest to
fact witness testimony. Belief warrants spring merely from substantial rele-
vant experience and the plausibility of the knowledge claim. In the shoe
54. Risinger, Functional Taxonomy, supra note 52, at 90-91 (footnote omitted).
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man's case, his ability to stay in business in a competitive field is the main
circumstance that warrants a belief in the general- accuracy of his summary
of the relevant contours and usages of the shoe business. This is not to say
there are not difficulties to be faced even in regard to such everyday sum-
marizational expertise. The worst difficulty is patrolling the line between
the kinds of general assertions that such experience warrants and asser-
tions that are so particularized that they cross the line into specific adjudi-
cative fact assertions. The particular area that illustrates this best, perhaps
because it commonly presents the most problems is what I have styled
"m.o./argot" testimony by police officers.
It is not uncommon for the prosecution in a criminal case to believe
that the jury needs to be educated about general contours of criminal en-
terprises and ways of operating in order to properly evaluate the adjudica-
tive fact evidence. It is probable that the average juror has no idea how a
"badger game" works, what quantities of drugs are normally purchased by
end users (and therefore what quantities indicate amounts probably in-
tended for sale rather than personal use), or what the current meaning of
the word "spliff" is on the street at a particular time and place. If such
knowledge is relevant to the interpretation of the testimony or other evi-
dence in the case, such education seems warranted, and it is not unreason-
able to believe that some law enforcement officers would have obtained
reliable information concerning those items during their careers. None-
theless, such testimony can easily slide from education to unjustified adju-
dicative fact assertion, morphing subtly from "more than an ounce is
rarely bought for personal use" through "more than an ounce is a sale
amount" to "the amount in this case was a sale amount." Similarly testi-
mony that "the word 'product' is often used to mean a contraband drug"
can morph through "the word 'product' usually means 'cocaine"' to
"when the defendants referred to 'product' on the tape in this case, he
meant 'cocaine."' Policing the proper boundary becomes even harder
when the court is facing one of the detectives who actually investigated the
case being tried, since that detective usually has actual adjudicative fact
information that he can legitimately testify to as a fact witness. For this
reason, judges should in general not allow case detectives to serve also as
"educational" experts. 55
In addition, such witnesses sometimes try to dress their summariza-
tional expertise up as some sort of translational expertise, often with some
sort of claim to scientific status, in order to claim both broader latitude
and more weight for their testimony. Offender profilers and crime
55. Id. at 94 n.1; see a/soJoelle Anne Moreno, What Happens When Dirty Harry
Becomes an (Expert) Witness for the Prosecution?, 79 TUL. L. REv. 1 (2004); D. Michael
Risinger & Jeffrey C. Loop, Three Card Monte, Monty Hall, Modus Operandi and Of-
fender Profiling: Some Lessons of Modern Cognitive Science for the Law of Evidence, 24
CARozo L. Riv. 193, 283-85 (2002) [hereinafter Three Card Monte]; D. Michael
Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on
the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REv. 99, 131-35 (2000).
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"linkage analysts" spring to mind.56 Obviously the warrant necessary for
such assertions ought to be different (and more onerous) than for mere
everyday summarizational/educational expertise.
We may now leave our consideration of everyday educational or sum-
marizational expertise and move on to a more controversial form of edu-
cational expertise, which we may call academic or technical
summarization. Perhaps the clearest example is the testimony of defense
experts in criminal cases regarding the weaknesses of eyewitness identifica-
tion who give no conclusions about the accuracy or inaccuracy of any iden-
tifications in the individual case. Rather, these defense experts summarize
the relevant findings of research on how various conditions affect the
likely accuracy of identifications made under such conditions. Much of
the prosecution-proffered "syndrome" expertise falls into the same cate-
gory: "I don't know if the witness in this case is making up the charge of
rape, but I will say you shouldn't be too influenced in making that judg-
ment because of the delay in complaining, because research tends to show
that a surprisingly high percentage of people actually raped do not imme-
diately complain."
While everyday summarizational/educational experts (the shoe man)
have been used without much actual reflection time out of mind, the kind
of technical or academic summarizational/educational expertise we are
now considering is a late-comer to the courtroom. Many courts have had a
difficult time accepting the propriety of such an expert witness who does
not give a specific "conclusion" or "opinion." The propriety of such an
expert function, however, was specifically recognized in the original advi-
sory committee notes to Federal Rule of Evidence 702,5 7 and the great
balance of authority now accepts it as at least notionally acceptable.
How to deal with rational belief warrants for such witnesses is not en-
tirely clear. One could argue that such exercises of expertise require less
demanding belief warrants than some other kinds of expert testimony be-
cause the witness is not making case-specific conclusions. But often the
purport of the witness's testimony applied to the individual case seems so
clear that this variable alone does not seem like a proper basis for loosen-
ing otherwise proper standards. So perhaps the best thing to say is that
such technical educational expert testimony should be subject to the same
standards as translational expertise in the same context. What those stan-
56. See Risinger, Three Card Monte, supra note 55, at 210-70 (examining his-
tory, theory and available validation data for "offender profiling" and crime
"linkage analysis").
57. "Most of the literature assumes that experts testify only in the form of
opinions. The assumption is logically unfounded. The rule accordingly recog-
nizes that an expert on the stand may give a dissertation or exposition of scientific
or other principles relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to
the facts." FED. R. Ev. 702 advisory committee's note (1975). Accord Amended
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note (2000). ("The amendment does not
alter the venerable practice of using expert testimony to educate the factfinder on
general principles.").
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dards should be generally cannot be adequately addressed without intro-
ducing the notion of science, so I will put that question off until I have
dealt with the kind of expert testimony that is most people's very model of
expert testimony, translational expertise.
When most people think of an expert performing an expert function
in court, they think of the expert testifying to an "opinion" or "conclu-
sion"-some non-obvious factual state that the expert has deduced from
material from which the jury could not derive the same conclusion. In
performing this function, the expert is claiming to be able to translate
information already present in the material into an accurate correspon-
dence with some other non-obvious fact that the jury is not capable of
inferring on its own. The language translator is the most basic illustration
of this kind of expertise, taking sounds encoded with information, existing
in the air of the courtroom equally available (as sounds) to both the jury
and the translator, and changing the information encoded in the sounds
from a form not rationally usable by the jury to a form that is rationally
usable by the jury. All experts who give "opinions" or "conclusions" per-
form an exactly analogous function.
There are many potential bases on which a witness can rest a claim to
be a reliable and valid translator. I have attempted elsewhere to give an
account of the logically possible claims to possession of a reliable and valid
translation system,58 and I will not repeat here all that I said there. It is
important to note, however, that some translation systems, when stripped
of the rhetoric with which they are often clothed, are almost exclusively a
claimed subjective skill. They often derive from experience and are per-
sonal to the individual translator while other systems can claim objective
criteria that can be applied relatively independently of individual skill in
many or most circumstances.
The general principle when dealing with translational expertise is to
first identify the characteristics of the claimed translation system as it ap-
plies to the task presented by the case at hand, and then identify the rea-
sons for believing that the claims of the system to accurate translation are
good enough for the legal context in which they are operating.
In order to make this more clear, I will of necessity have to conde-
scend to specifics. But before proceeding to examples I would like to
point out that, so far, nothing in particular has been said about separating
science from non-science. So far, not only has it been unnecessary, it
would have been positively obstructive to the enterprise of laying a founda-
tion for the various types of functional expertise we might encounter in
court. In my opinion, nothing has retarded proper analysis in this area, in
both the courts and the academy, like too much invocation of "science"
too soon in the analysis. But later, when we discuss how to approach belief
warrants about the translational systems lying behind various claims of ex-
pertise, we may no longer be able to avoid examining the phenomenon of
58. See Risinger, Functional Taxonomy, supra note 52, at 97-101.
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claimed scientific knowledge and wrestling with the demarcation problem
to boot. Up to now the notion of "science" has been largely irrelevant, but
it may become importantly relevant later.
Before proceeding to the renewed importance of the boundary prob-
lem, however, I would like to give an example that illustrates that proper
standards of belief warrant do not necessarily turn on resolving the sci-
ence/non-science boundary, and definitely cannot be viewed productively
according to some globally applicable uniform threshold of reliability,
however defined, above which expertise is admissible, and below which it
is inadmissible. Consider land valuation experts (real estate appraisers).
Assume a civil case involving a claim for damages turns on the estab-
lishment of the market value of a piece of real estate at a particular time.
The very notion of market value is fraught with conceptual difficulty be-
cause it is not really a fact, nor a predictive counterfactual (predicting
what would have happened in a sale in the real world), but rather a predic-
tive counterfactual under conditions not often obtained in the real world
(willing buyer, willing seller, equality and completeness of information,
etc.). Nevertheless, the law quite commonly incorporates this strange ab-
stract concept into remedial formulas.
Now market value is not a "fact," but no one claims that it is unrelated
to actual facts in the world. Sales of similar items in the real world are as
close as we can come to evidence of "market value," and in circumstances
where the real world approaches the conditions of the notional concept of
the ideal market fairly closely (fungible goods, active high volume market
and free flow of information-think money markets) the problems of
proof are generally inconsequential. When the actual conditions of real
world sales do not approach those conditions very closely (non-fungible
goods, relatively low-volume market, non-transportable goods creating ge-
ographic sub-markets, incomplete information, often unevenly distributed
between buyers and sellers in unpredictable patterns), however, proof of
"market value" is inherently imprecise. It is unlikely that we would trust a
jury to construct such a market value itself out of the raw materials of
evidence of various sales merely produced by the parties.
In this kind of case, the law finds itself in a dilemma. If the remedy
for a conceded wrong is made to turn on establishing market value, and if
under common circumstances the inherent indeterminacy of the concept
would seem to lead only to proof that was "speculative," the law has built
the common defeat ofjustice for failure of proof into the very fabric of its
remedial definition. What to do? Allow the plaintiff to dissolve the prob-
lem by pouring the universal solvent of "expertise" on it. As we will see,
this approach utilizes expertise of very low epistemic quality and turns out
to be a brilliant solution to a particular problem, making a silk purse out
of a couple of sow's ears. In such a case, both the plaintiff and the defen-
dant will call witnesses they claim to be possessed of "land valuation
expertise."
698 [Vol. 52: p. 679
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It should be no surprise that the reliability of such expertise by almost
any standard of evaluation is low. Such land appraisers are not even in
possession of a reliable taxonomic scheme for determining comparability
of sales, which is why the list of comparable sales cited by two such wit-
nesses is rarely the same, and often does not even overlap to any great
degree. 59 They generally make no claims to be practicing "science"
(though if they did there are a few science studies scholars who would
contend that such a claim was irresolvable, and as good as any other
claim). Yet, given the issue (not a binary decision about a fact in the
world, but an issue literally without a determinate single right answer, even
in theory), the applicable burden of persuasion (preponderance), the
jury's ability to actually understand and evaluate the plausibility of the tes-
timony60 and the failure of the law that would result if proof were found
impossible in most cases both in practice and in theory, the resulting ac-
commodation is brilliant. Plaintiffs' experts cheat as high on the value as
their notion of comparable sales and the "straight face" requirement will
allow. Defendants' experts do the same in the other direction, their
"translational" opinion testimony sets a floor and a ceiling, and whatever
the jury picks in the range so defined is a legally and morally proper result.
Yet I would hope that few readers would think it proper for a criminal
defendant to be convicted largely on the basis of prosecution-proffered
expertise offered on the issue of his identity as the perpetrator of the
charged crime, which expertise was of no greater reliability than the ex-
pertise of the average land appraiser.
6 1
What this illustrates to me, and I would hope to everyone, is the total
impropriety of any attempt to set up a single "reliability" scale with a single
test for the measure of reliability to be reached for admissibility, even if
such a scale could be credibly generated. Such a scale would afortiori and
by definition either require that we exclude the land appraisers or that we
admit against criminal defendants any prosecution-proffered expertise
which meets the reliability of land appraisers. This just cannot be right.
59. I have been involved in a few cases involving such expertise, and I was
initially shocked to discover this lack of overlap. Nonetheless, I know of no pub-
lished formal study to cite.
60. This is generally the case in testimony concerning residential real estate.
The variables in play are so near to jury common knowledge that one might be
tempted to regard the real function of the appraiser as merely a non-expert sum-
marizing the voluminous material of the comparable sales by analogy to FED. R.
EvID. 1006, except for the fact that the witness is always allowed to go beyond this,
both in selection of comparable sales and in giving an "opinion." None of this is to
say that some appraisal situations do not fairly involve variables that quickly get
beyond the jury's everyday competence, nor is it to say that courts should not exer-
cise gatekeeping control when appraisers (real estate or not) cross the line of plau-
sibility. See, e.g., Blue Dane Simmental Corp. v. Am. Simmental Ass'n, 178 F.3d
1035 (8th Cir. 1999).
61. The land valuation example is examined in greater detail in Risinger,
Functional Taxonomy, supra note 52, at 105.
21
Risinger: The Irrelevance, and Central Relevance, of the Boundary between S
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2007
VILIANOVA LAW REVIEW
One is therefore forced to admit that proper reliability standards for ex-
pert admissibility vary with function and context.
This should not be read to mean that a deciding court has some free-
floating discretion in the matter. For example, although in federal prac-
tice the Supreme Court's opinion in Kumho Tire v. Carmichae162 (the third
case in the famous Daubert trilogy) 63 does speak of discretion, leeway and
flexibility. I have been at some pains elsewhere to show that the Court
meant to provide discretion to select the most appropriate criteria of relia-
bility for a particular claim of expertise, not discretion in any broader
sense. 64 At any rate, what we are discussing here is how things should
work, not how courts have failed to make them work in various
circumstances.
So it seems the task for a court acting as gatekeeper in regard to
claimed expertise is three-fold: it must first determine the most appropri-
ate criteria to evaluate the strength of the belief warrant for the claimed
expertise applied to the task presented in the case at hand (which is the
same thing as its reliability as the term is used by Daubert), and it must next
decide the appropriate decision threshold for that type of case and con-
text. Only then can it properly decide if the reliability of the proffered
expertise meets the appropriate threshold of reliability for the law's pur-
poses. It is in making these judgments that courts will often not be able to
avoid coming to grips with science and the boundary problem.
The reason that the court will have to come to grips with the bound-
ary between science and non-science in making decisions about belief war-
rant is that the kinds of evidence warranting belief are different,
sometimes in degree and sometimes in kind, when one is clearly dealing
with expertise based on science and when one is clearly dealing with an
expert claim not based on science. It will therefore be necessary for the
court to have some notion of science. In addition, in some jurisdictions,
the science/non-science characterization determines the test of admissibil-
62. 526 U.S. 136, 142-52 (1999).
63. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), was the
initial case, of course, followed by General Electric Co. v.Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997),
which held that the "abuse of discretion" standard of review, the norm for eviden-
tiary rulings, applies to rulings excluding proffered expert testimony under Rule
702, but did not address the nature of the trial court's discretion.
64. D. Michael Risinger, Defining the "Task at Hand".- Non-Science Forensic Science
after Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 767, 773-77 (2000).
Justice Scalia apparently agrees: "The discretion [the Court] endorses-trial court
discretion in choosing the manner of testing expert reliability-is not discretion to
abandon the gatekeeping function. I think it is worth adding that it is not discre-
tion to perform the function inadequately. Rather, it is discretion to choose
among reasonable means.... ".Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 158-59 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
[Vol. 52: p. 679
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ity, 65 and in most jurisdictions it is officially relevant to admissibility.66 So
it is not amiss to give some account that will be of service in attacking the
boundary problem.
But the boundary between science and non-science is not perhaps the
only important boundary to understand. There is also the boundary be-
tween so called "pure science" and "applied science." As Caudill and La-
Rue perceptively point out, all science in the courtroom necessarily is
applied science in an important sense because the law rarely cares about
covering generalities independent of their application to determine facts
in the particular case.
6 7
Like everything else in this area, there is more here than initially
meets the eye. As we will see a bit later, even "pure science" as an enter-
prise must deal in predictions of unknown fact states as part of hypothesis
testing, and the preferred mode of testing is often (though not always)
one that controls the world in such a way as to bring about the predicted
fact state (experiment). The predictive control of nature is potentially
central to hypothesis testing even in the purest science. At least in theory,
however, the proper end products of pure science are reliable generalities
about the regularities of the facts of nature. Such knowledge can often
then be used to control the physical world in ways that humans could not
control it before, but such applications (and the issue of whether they
should be undertaken even if they can be) are not part of pure science
ideally conceptualized. 68 Every practical application of the discoveries of
science, from H-bombs to iPods, is part of applied science (engineering
and technology). 69 So it is of course true that most people don't really
65. That is, those jurisdictions still following the Frye test that derived from
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), which typically applies only to
"scientific evidence" (and usually only "novel" scientific evidence at that). See
FAiGMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 10.
66. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702 ("If scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact .. " (emphasis added)).
67. "Whenever science comes into the courtroom, it comes in not as pure
theory, but as applied science, and thus looks much like engineering. In court,
one asks questions such as 'Why did this bridge fall down?' or 'Is the blood found
at the crime scene the defendant's blood?' and so forth." CAUDILL & LARUE, supra
note 2, at 10.
68. See generally HUGH LACEY, IS SCIENCE VALUE FREE? VALUES AND SCIENTIFIC
UNDERSTANDING 5-15 (1999).
69. But importantly, not all technology is based entirely on scientific knowl-
edge. Much of it continues to be based on the trial-and-error tinkering of the
mere empirick" attempting to solve a particular problem of improved technologi-
cal performance. The term, as with its antique spelling, was originally used by
physicians trained in the theories of Galen as an epithet applied to less theoretical
practitioners. The fact that much technology is not the product of science is per-
haps less surprising than it might at first seem. Before there was any science, in the
modern sense, there was plenty of effective technology and the main generator of
such expert knowledge was the process of the mere empirick. See Laudan, supra
note 10, at 117. Knowledge gained by a mere empirick is based on empirical evi-
dence and observation, but not reduced to formal data. The effort of the mere
empirick is always directed toward the solution of a technical problem of impor-
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care much about science except insofar as it can become applied science,
and they don't separate the two domains very clearly. Be that as it may, it
is necessary to address reliability problems as they arise in application in
order to evaluate the belief warrant in the individual case. So after talking
of science per se, we will address questions of application and also ques-
tions of belief warrant for expertise making no claim to the mantle of
science, or making an unsustainable claim.
What follows is a work in progress. A form of it first appeared in an
article co-authored with Mark Denbeaux and Michael Saks in 1998. A sig-
nificant revision and expansion was included in a paper Professor Saks
and I presented in March of 2006 to the annual Coronado Conference of
the Institute for Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy. While its various
forms have thus appeared in co-authored works, Professors Denbeaux and
Saks graciously (and perhaps even gleefully, considering what might be
seen in some quarters as the text's amateur presumptuousness) concede
that the text and approach are primarily my responsibility.7 0
It is sometimes said that accounts of complex subjects come in two
forms: too true to be good, and too good to be true. The "too true to be
good" variety addresses every problem at a high level of magnification. It
tance, and results in technology, sometimes very effective technology, without sci-
ence in the modern sense. Consider the development of the moldboard plow, for
instance.
The expertise of the mere empirick solves technology problems by trial and
error guided by common sense generalities without attempting to derive many
significant non-obvious generalities of any higher order. It is largely practice with
little theory. Its technical solutions are the domain of tinkerers and tend to be
incremental over time, though sometimes brilliantly so. So the expertise of the
mere empirick is not necessarily always so mere. One can still get a fair debate
going over whether Edison was in fact a scientist or simply a gifted empirick tin-
kerer with a lot of ingenuity for the solution of particular problems of control.
Importantly, when the mere empirick method does generate theory, there may be
little checking done concerning the ways in which the theory actually holds in
other contexts of practice. It is said that the Native Americans famously taught
early European settlers to plant corn accompanied by a fish. The result of this
practice was bountiful corn crops. One would have to say that this represented
effective expert knowledge of a sort, and expert knowledge that was desirable to
obtain for the purposes of survival through the growing of corn. But let us assume
that the native peoples also accompanied the planting with an incantation, and
both the fish and the incantation were thought to be necessary. Nothing in the
practices of the mere empirick would necessarily suggest that it was important to
determine the relative contributions of the fish part and the incantation part of
the practice.
A high percentage of what counts as technological advance is traceable to the
actions of the mere empirick still, and such practices still play a significant role in
designing and adjusting various kinds of apparatus in the practice of experimental
sciences. When technical knowledge claims turn out to be largely based on the
practice of mere empiricks, they should be closely held to statements concerning
the relationship between specific practices and demonstrated success. For a fur-
ther discussion of technical knowledge based on mere empiricks, see infra note
121 and accompanying text.
70. Personal communications with Denbeaux and Saks dating back to 1998
up until fall 2006.
[Vol. 52: p. 679
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is excellent for specialists, but quickly loses non-specialists, such as judges
and lawyers, and does not provide them with what they need to deal with
the problems that they face. The "too good to be true" variety simplifies to
the point of giving an account so divorced from reality that it may make
the audience feel as if they had learned something, but it in fact it may be
counterproductive in giving a false picture concealing the real problems
the audience needs to understand. 7 1 What I have tried to do is give an
account of modern science as a social enterprise that is good enough for a
novice to understand, and true enough to highlight the important points
for judges and lawyers in approaching an evaluation of the products of
science, in separating them from non-science claims of knowledge. With
any luck, the account will in some sense have succeeded to the extent it
seems banal. Most of the necessary qualifications will appear in the foot-
notes, and qualifications deemed unnecessary for current purposes will be
banished altogether.
What I am attempting might be called an effort at a simplified norma-
tive theory of science as a human practice.7 2 It is simplified for the rea-
sons just given. It is normative in three senses. First, it is normative in the
sense that it tries to specify general criteria that must be met for a practice
to qualify as science in the modern sense. Second, it is normative in the
sense that it asserts the specialness of the products of the described prac-
tices as knowledge claims. Third, it is normative in that it is idealized,
hopefully not in the sense that draws the ire of the science studies commu-
nity, but in another sense. The "idealized science" attacked by science
studies and by Caudill and LaRue 73 is based on the assertion (often im-
plicit) that scientific practice, including the practices of all "true scien-
fists," realizes the ideals of the theory of scientific enquiry, and therefore
generate "scientific truths." That notion of "idealized science" is rightfully
viewed as pernicious in the light of actual practice that scientific studies
have had a large hand in describing as it actually occurs. Indeed, as
pointed out above, virtually no one involved in the practice of science seri-
ously disputes this (even though this sense of the "idealized" view has con-
71. This would yield something akin to the "beermat expertise"-the kind of
shallow knowledge about technical subjects one can read off the back of some
beermats in Britain, apparently. In the United States, it is found inside Snapple
caps that figures prominently in the redoubtable Harry Collins's latest foray into
taxonomizing the notion of expertise. See Harry Collins & Rob Evans, The "Periodic
Table" of Expertises (2004), www.cf.uk/socsi/expert.
72. For a useful discussion of the utility of such normative theories, and the
inter-relation among theory, practice and criticism, in the context of an examina-
tion of rhetoric, see THOMAS B. FARRELL, NoRMs OF RHETORICAL CULTURE 3-8
(1993). I think it is fair to note, for what it is worth, that what is set out in this
article would be not too far away from the way that many, perhaps most, practicing
scientists approach the defining characteristics of modern science. See, e.g.,
Charles Liu, Not Seeing is Believing, 116 NAT. HIST. 52 (2007) (providing account of
science given by Charles Liu, Professor of Astrophysics at City University of New
York, in article on dark matter issue in astrophysics).
73. See CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 2, at 3-4, 64-74.
703
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tinued popular influence). But when I say what follows is "idealized" I
have in mind a different meaning: That the view sets down normative cri-
teria of science and science practice that exist to promote the truth value
of its products, and which practitioners must strive to conform to as part of
the internal criteria of what it means to be practicing science, even though
everyone knows they will never be perfectly attained. Far from being per-
nicious, such standards of ideal practice (which of course may change over
time as awareness of error-producing dimensions of practice come to
light), 7 4 though they are often as much aspirational as prescriptive, 75 per-
form the function of disciplining the practitioners of the enterprise of sci-
ence into the practices that define it and account for its successes. And
some of those criteria are explicitly social. Even Newton and Einstein
needed others to check their work, not merely in the sense of conve-
nience, but in the sense that multiple evaluation adds epistemic strength.
Indeed, a main strength of science lies in acculturation to good individual
practices, 76 coupled with multiple evaluations 77 to procedurally check and
hopefully cancel inevitable individual bias.
The kind of knowledge that comprises the realm and object of scien-
tific inquiry is knowledge about the universe accessible to the senses (ei-
ther directly or as extended by validated sense-enhancing technology).
74. For instance, the second half of the 20th century saw the general accept-
ance of the necessity for masking protocols in any research setting using humans
as perceptors, raters or interpreters, in order to cancel "observer effects," a meth-
odological improvement leading to greatly increased epistemic strength of data
and conclusions. See D. Michael Risinger, MichaelJ. Saks, William C. Thompson &
Robert Rosenthal, The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Sci-
ence: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 6-9 (2002). In
this regard, "science is a moving target that the standards for successful scientific
theories shift with time. It is not just our view of the universe that shifts, but our
view of what kinds of views we should have or can have." STEVEN WEINBERG, FACING
UP: SCIENCE AND ITS CULTURAL ADVERSARIES 84 (2001).
75. It is often said that a fundamental precept of statements about obligation
is that "ought implies can" in the sense that it is wrong to erect standards of moral-
ity that require people to do what they cannot do. See Ronald J. Allen & Brian
Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87 VA. L. REv 1491, 1499
(2001). That does not mean, however, that it is wrong to require people to try to
come close to an unattainable ideal. They "ought" to come as close as they can,
and they "can" (tautologically) come as close as they can. What is required is per-
haps related to Lon Fuller's distinction between the morality of prescription and
the morality of aspiration. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw, ch. 1 (1965).
Parts of the ideals of science practice (those prohibiting fraud and related sins for
instance) are clearly prescriptive, but other parts are perhaps best looked upon as
aspirational, though the aspiration and some effort toward it may in fact be
prescriptive.
76. It is therefore not surprising that the values Merton described as shared
by scientists as a matter of sociological fact-communalism, universalism, disinter-
estedness and organized skepticism-are closely related to the normative values
that give theoretical support to the knowledge claims generated by science. See
MERTON, supra note 27.
77. By "multiple evaluation" I mean to encompass both a collaborative sense
and a critical sense.
[Vol. 52: p. 679
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Modern science recognizes that the knowledge it generates is probabilistic
at its root. Nevertheless, its claims to progress are founded on the assump-
tion that knowledge can approach truth asymptotically. Just like the asym-
ptotic function that generates values that approach an axis infinitely
closely without ever actually touching it, it may be impossible to reach the
truth about the material world, but it is possible to know when one has
gotten nearer along the curve of approach.
78
The way science generates knowledge about the world accessible to
the senses, the typical structures of knowledge that this enterprise yields
and the principles by which such knowledge is taken to be validated are,
perhaps unsurprisingly, not completely worked out in a way subject to to-
tal agreement either among practitioners of science or among those who
make the examination of the enterprise their own subject of inquiry (that
is, philosophers, sociologists and historians of science). Nevertheless, for
our purposes, the general characteristics of the enterprise may be fairly
well limned.
Any general account of the scientific enterprise must give due regard
to four central characteristics. The characteristics include: the centrality
of data, the necessity of taxonomy, the equal centrality of the imaginative
generation of hypotheses (and the integrated systems of hypotheses
known as theories) and the equally important necessity of the testing of
those hypotheses. Each of these four characteristics feeds off the other
three and each contains mysteries of its own.
The report of a single observation of a condition (either by the senses
or by technical extension of the senses) can be called a datum in the sense
that it is foundational to the scientific enterprise, but a random collection
of such observations would not generate data in the sense that modern
science uses the term. 79 Instead, science requires standardization of the
78. Larry Laudan suggests that one difference between at least one type of
realist and one type of pragmatist in the philosophy of science is that the realist
believes we can judge ourselves so closely to truth that one is justified in referring
to certain propositions as true (or approximately true), while the pragmatist ac-
cepts that we can tell when we are closer without being justified in having any firm
belief that we are very close at all. See Laudan, supra note 10, at 143-45. Even such
a pragmatist, however, would probably not object to the use of the word "true"
understood as shorthand for "provisionally true" or "taken as true for now, for
purposes of human choice, subject to defeasance by new evidence or better ac-
counts in the future." A strict Popperian would probably object to the invocation
of the word "true" under any circumstances. See Susan Haack, Trial and Error: The
Supreme Court's Philosophy of Science, 95J. PUB. HEALTH 66, 67 (Supp. No. 1 2005).
79. Here is the place to make some observations about the oft-repeated no-
tion that all observations are "theory laden." The source of the modern version of
this notion is often traced to Willard van Orman Quine's 1950 essay, Two Dogmas of
Empiricism (though Quine referenced the earlier work of Pierre Duhem, there is a
great deal of disagreement about the relationship between Quine's and Duhem's
views). See ZAMMITO, supra note 17, at 17-25. But the idea that human perceptions
and observations are interpretively affected, even prior to conscious awareness, by
pre-existing cognitive categories whether culturally derived or hard-wired in the
brain goes back at least as far as (of all people) Comte, and is a staple of modern
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conditions of such reports and a formal analytical system for their organi-
zation. A central condition that must be present is theoretical reproduc-
ibility of observation (two observers in the same position could perceive
the same thing), with strong favor given to reports of observations that can
be practically repeated by multiple observers. Stronger favor should be
given to reports that reflect dimensions of an event that can be mea-
sured 80 and even stronger favor given to dimensions that can be measured
quantitatively with some precision and with demonstrable sensitivity, relia-
bility and validity.8 1
These reports must be organized according to some analytic system of
similarities and differences that generates hierarchies of categories. In
short, the enterprise of science requires an explicit, formal and generally
well worked out taxonomy. These taxonomic conditions for the collection
and organization of observations are necessary conditions82 for the enter-
prise of science, but not sufficient in and of themselves to constitute a
science. This is not to say that the descriptive organization of observations
is not valuable in itself. Whole branches of human knowledge, including
much of history and philosophy, are marked by taxonomic work of this
sort. The taxonomic enterprise is not unscientific, but it does not by itself
make a science. It is a necessary but not sufficient condition. Science
must go beyond descriptive taxonomy of even the most quantified sort to
the enterprise of hypothesis and theory creation.
cognitive psychology. "No real observation of any kind of phenomena is possible,
except in as far as it is first directed, and finally interpreted, by some theory." THE
POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE 2 (Harriet Martineau trans.) (1855). See,
e.g., ULRIc NEISSER, COGNITION AND REALITY- PRINCIPLES AND IMPLICATIONS OF COG-
NITIWE PSYCHOLOGY 43-44 (1976); Risinger et al., supra note 74, at 12-24. That
being said, it seems irrational to believe that every part of every observation is to-
tally determined by pre-existing cognitive investments. The externally existing ob-
ject generating the phenomenon observed provides something, and like the
debate concerning "social constructionism" in general, the issue becomes "how
much." Suffice it to say that the term "theory laden" suggests too low a contribu-
tion from the object observed, at least under many conditions, and it is part of the
job of science to discover the conditions that raise the contribution of the external
world and diminish the contribution of such "observer effects." For a further dis-
cussion, see supra note 74.
80. What I am setting out here is intentionally loose in regard to the criteria
of what can count as formal data. I am personally quite accepting of qualitative
observational reports as data that can underlie a scientific enterprise, as long as
they are formally recorded according to some standards generally agreed upon in
the relevant research community, in an attempt to discipline and standardize the
process of observation and recordation.
81. In non-quantitative traditions, each observation may be noted as a part of
the data, but in more quantitative traditions, a mathematical aggregation may be
referred to as "data."
82. I am not claiming that one cannot have science without perfect taxon-
omy. That would be self-defeating, since perfect taxonomy is as unattainable as is
perfect anything else. The necessary taxonomic conditions are themselves asym-
ptotic to perfection and to be judged pragmatically in regard to the problems to be
addressed.
[Vol. 52: p. 679
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A scientific hypothesis is a statement about inter-relationships be-
tween taxonomic items or categories. Strong preference is given to hy-
potheses formulated in such a way that they can generate predictions
about unknown states of fact and as a result be subjected to empirical
testing. A theory is a set of interconnected hypotheses of varying general-
ity that account for a wide range of phenomena.
8 3
A hypothesis that cannot at least in principle lead to empirically testa-
ble predictions is a metaphysical proposition that is by definition not part
of science. 84 A hypothesis that is potentially subject to testing but has
never been tested is unproven and cannot be treated as a source of de-
pendable scientific knowledge. 85 A hypothesis that has been subjected to
83. This is a good place to mention the "underdetermination thesis," which
holds that no theory is uniquely determined by a set of observations, that is, that
there are always potential alternative theories covering the observations even
though those theories are inconsistent with the first theory under consideration.
This is generally seen as another Quine proposition. See ZAMrro, supra note 17 at
25-33. This is also likely true in some sense, but in its strongest form it is perhaps
near trivial in practice, because as Lauden points out, the practical context always
presents problems of choosing between warrants for a theory and any of its known
rivals, for which good reasons for preference can exist. See Larry Lauden, Demystify-
ing Underdetermination, in SCIENTIFIC THEORIES 267, 277 (C. Wade Savage ed. 1990).
So the fact that theories are not uniquely determined (in theory), assuming this to
be the case, is of little import in practical theory choice, and of virtually no use to
practicing scientists; it is of as little interest to many of them as debates about
radical skepticism among philosophers are to detectives attempting to solve a
crime, or lawyers,judges and juries involved in the process of determining the facts
giving rise to a particular controversy.
84. One must be cautious not to go too far with this statement. Imaginary
non-testable entities are often part of theory construction, though the theory itself
is expected to yield testable predictions. And conjectures that do not lead to im-
mediately obvious testable hypotheses may be part of the process of theory build-
ing by what C.S. Pierce famously (and still somewhat mysteriously) labeled
abduction. See DANIEL DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESs EXPLAINED 262-263 (1991).
85. One should be careful not to conclude that hypotheses that have not un-
dergone testing according to the standards of science can never be a properly war-
ranted source of reliable knowledge. For a further discussion, see supra notes 51,
69, and infra note 121. Indeed, as Susan Haack has said, "not all, and not only,
scientific evidence is reliable." Haack, supra note 78, at 66. For this reason, both
Professor Haack (not unlike Professor Laudan) appears skeptical of virtually any
approach to the demarcation problem, preferring to get down to the specific rea-
sons for a strong or weak belief warrant for any claim, and simply bypassing the
question of ultimate label as unnecessary once this is done. See id. at 69. There is
much to recommend this approach. It is a great corrective for confusing the be-
stowal of the honorific "science" with the necessary presence of reliable knowl-
edge. I believe, however, that a familiarity with a general notion of what
constitutes the characteristics and strengths at the core of the enterprise of mod-
ern science can assist a court or a lawyer in separating weakly warranted from
strongly warranted claims, both within the core of science, and in other areas of
empirical inquiry. Professor Haack herself seems to have some such a notion in
mind when she suggests that "it seems both feasible and useful to try to ensure that
judges understand the more commonly employed scientific ideas they are likely to
encounter most frequently .... Id. at 71. Here it seems that there must be some
general criterion implied for the selection of the ideas that are "scientific." All I
hope to have done is flesh out a version of this in a way that might be useful to its
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substantial empirical testing and has not been falsified may properly be
treated as validated for the time being. Although all empirical testing is
essentially a probabilistic enterprise and thus no hypothesis is ever subject
to absolute verification, the nature of both the data and the fit of the hy-
pothesis with other more or less validated principles may push the
probability of the truth of the hypothesis (and its entailed conclusions) so
high that it would be crazy to spend much time worrying about the
residual probability of falsity for any practical purpose. 86
The fourth major aspect of the scientific enterprise is real-world em-
pirical testing of the truth of the relationships asserted by hypotheses and
the theories that both derive from and generate hypotheses. Like the tax-
onomic aspect, the empirical testing aspect involves careful observations of
phenomena through the senses. However, empirical testing is focused on
the observations capable of testing (falsifying) a hypothesis, whereas taxo-
nomically (and theoretically) important observations may be made in a
much less directed way. 87 The empirical testing enterprise contains a
whole constellation of special problems involving, among other things,
how to determine what observations and conditions of observation are in
fact consistent or inconsistent with a hypothesis. 88
Data collection, taxonomy building, hypothesis making/theory gener-
ation and empirical testing are not totally separate enterprises, of course,
and every practicing scientist will have familiarity with each process, at
intended audience. I hope that it is, to use a breezy phrase sometimes abused by
contractors, "close enough for government work." For a similar justification for
such an attempt, see David B. Resnik, A Pragmatic Approach to the Demarcation Prob-
lem, 31 STUD. HIST. PHIL. Sci. 249 (2000).
86. For instance, under certain conditions DNA analysis may establish that
the random match probability that anyone other than the accused in a criminal
case was the source of a particular residue is so low that the inference that the
defendant was the source is "virtually" or "morally" certain, and worrying about the
residual doubt is neither reasonable nor required. But one is required to be sure
the conditions are present.
87. "The most exciting phrase to hear in science, the one that heralds new
discoveries, isn't 'Eureka!' but rather 'Hmm ... that's funny.'" The observation is
often attributed, probably wrongly, to Isaac Asimov. Of course, "that's funny" sug-
gests an unexpected observation, an anomaly, and not all anomalous observations
lead to advances. The role of and tolerance of anomaly in science is one of the
most difficult and contested of all subjects in the philosophy of science. It was a
centerpiece of THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, espe-
cially ch. 6, Anomaly and the Emergence of Scientific Discoveries. For a further discus-
sion of the role of and tolerance of anomaly in science, see Laudan, supra note 10,
at 71-92.
88. The special problems also include the implications of new data on theory
choice. The exact specification of criteria for proper choice between known com-
peting theories, and the epistemic status of that choice, especially given the possi-
bility of theories not yet conceived, is a matter of substantial dispute among
philosophers of science. Some are comfortable with treating chosen theories as
true until displaced, while others have suggested that the word "true" inevitably
overstates the warrant for a theory. See LARRY LAUDAN, BEYOND POSITIVISM AND REL-
ATIVISM (1996). For further discussion, see supra note 85. The relativists, of course,
say that there is never any truth-related reason for theory choice.
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least within the confines of their area of interest. Each process feeds on
the other, with new data putting pressure on existing taxonomies, provid-
ing material that hypotheses and theories must take into account, hypoth-
eses and theories providing predictions to which testing must be directed,
and new observations made while testing hypotheses which must then be
absorbed into taxonomies. It is important to note that individual practi-
tioners within the enterprise of science may show marked predilections for
one function or another. People whose strength is hypothesis generation/
theory building may, for reasons of esthetics or ego, display quite "un-
scientific" commitment to the validity of their hypotheses in advance of
testing (which may sometimes bear them out and sometimes shatter
them). In fact, it may even be that such an "unscientific" emotional com-
mitment is necessary to drive most such people through the act of creative
imagination necessary for the hypothesis generation. Since science is a
human enterprise involving a large number of individuals, it is to be ex-
pected that mixed or impure motives will drive many individuals and re-
sult in work manifesting a range of vices from wishful interpretations of
data to fudging to outright fraud. Nevertheless, given the range of extra-
science views and interests represented in a scientific community, and
their inevitable conflict, the community basis of scientific practice gener-
ally operates to cancel out many manifestations of bias. In addition, the
socialization into the common standards for the practice of science, the
community emphasis on testing and the existence of professional rewards
for carrying it out, hopefully ensure that, in general, claims do not get too
far ahead of the evidence or stay there for too long.
Uncommonly, a single individual may combine substantial talents in
all four foundational areas. For example, Darwin was a first-class primary
observer and taxonomist as well as theoretician who was quite sensitive to
the need for testing. Others may not. Einstein made few primary observa-
tions and was not particularly interested in the dirty details of confirma-
tory (or disconfirmatory) testing (though he of course recognized the
necessity for it, and involved himself when he felt it necessary). 89 Never-
theless, whatever the idiosyncrasies of the individuals involved, for an en-
terprise and its products to qualify as a science, its group practice must
manifest all four functions in a balanced, ongoing and dynamic way, even
if its individual practitioners do not always do so.
These are the main commonalities of all modern science. Each sepa-
rable area of investigation will have its own strengths and weaknesses and
its own supplementary principles of good practice in the fulfillment of the
four common functions. For instance, science is easiest where the phe-
nomena in question present highly fungible manifestations. If we are in-
vestigating the behavior of atoms of a certain isotope of silver, we are
89. Einstein encouraged Dayton Miller to undertake interferometer studies in
the 1920s that would test Einstein's relativity theory. See COLLINS & PINCH, supra
note 37, at 42.
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justified in treating all such atoms alike for most purposes. This fortunate
circumstance eliminates the risk of sampling error and most arguments
concerning the external validity of experimental observation. On the
other hand, when we deal with biological systems (including humans), in-
dividual variation in most phenomena of interest is the rule rather than
the exception, making valid generalities harder to establish, more subject
to controversy and more likely to be expressed in terms of large set
probability rather than more' exact prediction. Whatever the area and the
special considerations involved, however, there must be a manifest com-
munity practice in the four foundational functions. This is the engine and
the strength of the scientific enterprise.
To this point, we have dealt with an idealized description of what is
often called "pure" science, albeit with a human face. This account follows
the traditional notion of the end of pure science: knowledge of fundamen-
tal regularities in the material world. Of course, much scientific inquiry is
driven at least in part by desires for control of the world as well as knowl-
edge of it, that is, control beyond what it necessary for the core pure sci-
ence function of testing hypotheses. In reality, much, perhaps most,
scientific research is driven by prospects of useful application (and the
psychological and perhaps other rewards that accompany it) as well as a
pure thirst for knowledge. 90 This has been a theme from the beginnings
of the emergence of modern science as a recognizably distinct approach
to knowledge, and it is a virtually inevitable by-product of the politics of
funding, whether from public or private sources. While the boundary be-
tween pure science and applied science is useful conceptually, in practice
it is a boundary that is very fuzzy. It is often easier to draw a boundary
between scientific and other kinds of knowledge than it is to draw a
boundary between pure and applied science. And, as Caudill and LaRue
quite properly point out, science in the courtroom is of necessity applied
science, since we are only concerned with its implications for the particu-
lar case at hand.9 1 It is therefore important to understand the special
problems of knowledge and controversy that mark the application of sci-
90. "Pure science" was once considered a branch of philosophy (natural phi-
losophy). In this regard, consider the following from William Seeley, a neurologist
and neuroscience researcher at the University of California, San Francisco, speak-
ing on recent research dealing with the brain's role in producing the self:
Once we know which brain regions are involved in self-representation, I
think we can take an even closer look at which cells in that brain region
are important and then look deeper and say which molecules within cells
and which genes that govern them lead to this vulnerability [to demen-
tias]. And if we've done that, we've gotten closer to disease mechanisms
and cures. That's the best reason to study all this. It's not just to inform
philosophers.
Carl Zimmer, The Neurobiology of the Self 293 Sci. Am. 93, 101 (2005) (quoting Wil-
liam Seeley).
91. See CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 2, at 10 (noting that science never comes
into courtroom as pure theory).
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entific knowledge to individual predictions and evaluations, as well as the
concomitant control of the world that derives from such application.
First, many technical applications of science-derived knowledge, those
that are used to predict and control individual circumstances in the world,
involve non-controversial and well established claims of knowledge. 92
When you think of it, this is not only often as it should be; it is almost as it
must be.93 Nobody wants a bridge engineer to use controversial bases of
prediction in the design of a bridge. Indeed, there is a theory of the soci-
ology of engineering which asserts that the tendency when incorporating
new knowledge into design is to over-engineer, to provide both redundan-
cies and large error margins.94 It is only later when those initial designs
(bridges, for instance) succeed that new designs reducing margins of error
are generated, which often move in later designs into zones of high failure
risk.
9 5
Pure science in its ideal version is value neutral in regard to all values
except its "veritistic" or "truth conducive" internal values (sometimes re-
ferred to as cognitive values).96 This strong claim is actually capable of
strong defense. 97 To the extent goals of control begin to influence agen-
das of inquiry, however, science is not, as an enterprise, value neutral in its
selection of problems to explore. In addition, application of scientific
knowledge is never value neutral, because it is directed toward goals of
control, and there is always a normative choice underlying any decision
concerning what to control, and why. The presence of such value motiva-
tions in regard to much that is claimed to be science in the courtroom
92. See generally Henry Petroski, Reference Guide on Engineering Practice and Meth-
ods, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 577, 577-624 (Federal Judicial
Center ed., 2d ed. 2000).
93. See LEwIs THOMAS, THE LIvEs OF A CELL 118 (1974).
This is the element that distinguishes applied science from basic. Sur-
prise is what makes the difference. When you are organized to apply
knowledge, set up targets, produce a usable product, you require a high
degree of certainty from the outset. All the facts on which you base pro-
tocols must be reasonably hard facts with unambiguous meaning. The
challenge is to plan the work and organize the workers so that it will
come out precisely as predicted. For this, you need centralized authority,
elaborately detailed time schedules, and some sort of reward system based
on speed and perfection. But most of all you need the intelligible basic
facts to begin with, and these must come from basic research. There is
no other source. In basic research, everything is just the opposite. What
you need at the outset is a high degree of uncertainty; otherwise it isn't
likely to be an important problem. You start with an incomplete roster of
facts, characterized by their ambiguity; often the problem consists of dis-
covering the connections between unrelated pieces of information. You
must plan experiments on the basis of probability, even bare possibility,
rather than certainty.
Id.
94. See PETROSKI, supra note 92, at 595-99.
95. See id.
96. See LACEY, supra note 68, at 45-66. See generally LAUDAN, supra note 10.
97. See id. at 1-87.
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calls for special caution in judging how well the process generating the
asserted scientific knowledge has lived up to the ideals of science
practice.
9 8
This summary account of the social process of science is not inconsis-
tent with much of anything of any importance said in Daubert or Kumho
Tire, and it should actually make it relatively easy to deal with the status of
some shaky claims to scientific knowledge put forth in the courtroom.
Take Simon Cole's main subject of study, fingerprint identification. The
theory of fingerprint identification is both quite simple, and quite obvi-
ously not the product of any process that would be recognized as science
in the modern sense. The foundational tenets are, first, that the friction
ridges on human skin are the product of some process that introduces a
high degree of randomness into their patterns; second, that such patterns
remain stable over a person's life; third, that the pattern is unique to each
person; and fourth, that human beings can be taught to compare a print
of initially unknown origin to a print of known origin and, at least much of
the time, make perfect source attributions with no possibility of error.
As Professor Cole has amply demonstrated, the general theory was
generated in the absence of much formal data, and it has never been put
to any rigorous formal testing. In addition, its claim of "zero error rate"
betrays the 19th century "Sherlock Holmes Science" origins of the theory.
No modern theory of application would claim a "zero error rate" for any
process, especially anything using a human being as the instrument of
evaluation. Therefore, identifications made pursuant to the theory cannot
derive whatever epistemic value they have from their derivation according
to the standards of science (almost no formal data, no testing-no sci-
ence). This does not necessarily mean that such identifications, or the
theory pursuant to which they are made, have no other sources of support-
ing evidence, but it does make it inappropriate to regard them as entitled
to whatever epistemic credit is due the methods of science (and it makes
the fingerprint identification practitioners' claims to the mantle of science
insupportable).
When faced with these virtually incontestable lacunae, the fingerprint
identification community responds in the main by saying that long success
in practice supplies a proxy for the missing formal data and formal testing.
There is occasionally some good sense in this kind of claim, but the prob-
lem is that it usually goes too far by ignoring whether there is unambigu-
ous feedback revealing accurate and mistaken results in practice. 99 As
Professor Denbeaux and I have written: 100
98. See generally D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Rationality, Research and
Leviathan: Law Enforcement-Sponsored Research and the Criminal Process, 4 MICH. ST. L.
RExv. 1023 (2003).
99. See generally Cole, supra note 48.
100. The following text is from Mark P. Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger,
Kumho Tire and Expert Reliability: How the Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get,
34 SETON HALL L. REv. 15, 67-72 (2003). Footnotes have been renumbered to
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Putting aside the overblown nineteenth century language of ab-
solute uniqueness in which the claims of fingerprint identifica-
tion are usually expressed, the main claim may be reformulated
in more acceptable modern terminology, thus: Human skin con-
tains a fairly sizable extent of ridged skin on the palms and fin-
gers of the hands and the soles and toes of the feet. The usual
theoretical account for its function is that the ridges increase fric-
tion on the surfaces,0 where increased friction for traction and
gripping would be of survival benefit. Such work as has been
done on the subject indicates that the pattern of ridges in any
given individual is constant throughout life.10 2 Setting aside the
question of whether no two people share the "exact" same pat-
tern of ridges and perceptible detail associated with them, it is
clear that not every person has the same pattern of ridges as
every other person across the entire extent of their ridged skin.
Indeed, though surprisingly little defensible formal research has
been done on the question, it seems apparent enough from anec-
dotal information that variation is so common that "exact
matches" across the entire range of ridged skin are vanishingly
rare (if they occur at all in the human population now alive).
There is apparently some mechanism at work in the fetal devel-
opment stage which triggers the generation of the ridges by a
process that exhibits a fair amount of randomness at a fine level
of organization and detail1 ° 3 (though the patterns fit general cat-
conform serially to the current article, and in some instances have been
supplemented.
101. See United States v. Llera Plaza, 2002 WL 27305, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
[hereinafter Llera Plaza I] (quoting the testimony of Dr. William Babler, President
of the American Dermatoglyphics Association, given in United States v. Mitchell, 199
F. Supp. 2d 820 (E.D. Pa. 2002)); see also Cole, supra note 42, at 108. [Note: Llera
Plaza I was vacated, superseded, and depublished by United States v. Llera Plaza,
179 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002) [hereinafter Llera Plaza I1]] Though it was
initially given the citation 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 in the Federal Supplement advance
sheets, it was not published in the bound volume. After an outcry from the aca-
demic community that the opinion might be lost to history, Westlaw decided to
continue to carry the opinion. Hence the use of the Westlaw references at this
remove.
102. David A. Stoney, Fingerprint Identification: Scientific Status, at § 34:39 in 4
Faigman et al., supra note 10, at 260 [hereinafter "Scientific Status"]; Llera Plaza I,
2002 WL 27305, at *1 (Babler testimony).
103. Variations in detail are often attributed to random in utero influences,
mostly of a mechanical sort. See COLE, supra note 42, at 114. However, more may
be going on than that. A start is being made at understanding how various
processes, including biological processes, can generate self-organizing patterns dis-
playing such a combination of order and randomness by beginning with a set of
relatively simple conditions and subjecting them to fairly simple algorithms which
instantiate both positive and negative feedback. See Scott Camazine, Patterns in
Nature, NATURAL HIsroRY, June 2003, at 34, 40; see generally ScoTr CAMAZINE ET L.,
SELF-ORGANIZATION IN BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS (2001).
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egories of pattern at a grosser level of examination).1"4 How-
ever, because the ridges are generally curvilinear in complex
ways, describing the amount of randomness and the likelihood of
a random match is a daunting theoretical problem. 10 5 Even
describing what constitutes a match is a problem, because, con-
trary to popular belief, matches are often not manifested in any-
thing resembling perfect superimposability. The curved and
deformable nature of surfaces upon which prints of ridged skin
may be left, and the deformable nature of skin itself, often
defeats exact superimposition, so that even with prints reflecting
large extents of ridges, matching may be an exercise in complex
topographical judgment in accounting for such (usually mild but
perceptible) deformities preventing superimposition. 10 6
So, while the formal research necessary tojustify such a state-
ment with formal data has not been done, and the empirical and
theoretical work which would give a proper explanatory account
of the mechanism behind the organization of ridged skin has not
been done, 10 7 it seems uncontroversial in any serious way to say
that the amount of randomness in ridge organization is such that
"no two people" share the same pattern in a confusable way
across the entire extent of their ridged skin. We do not, how-
ever, use the entire extent of ridged skin for identification pur-
poses. Partly because of convenience in "rolling" such prints and
partly because it is the print most likely to be left on a surface
inadvertently, we use only the ridged skin on the balls of the fin-
gers. The standard practice known to everyone who has ever
been "fingerprinted" is to ink the balls of the fingers and roll
them onto a card in boxes marked out for each digit. The result
is a set of ten prints of known orientation comprising about one
square-inch each, for a total of roughly ten square-inches of
ridged skin. 10 8 Again, as in the case of the entire extent of
ridged skin, the formal research necessary to establish random
match probabilities for two sets of ten prints from different peo-
ple has not been done, but it seems fair to conclude that such
probability is sufficiently minuscule not to trouble the practical
certainty which we seek in the law. When an unidentified body is
found, and a ten print card is rolled from the fingers of the
104. See COLE, supra note 42, at 115 (defining classes of arches, loops and
whorls).
105. See id. at 260; see generally David A. Stoney & John I. Thornton, A Critical
Analysis of Quantitative Fingerprint Individuality Models, 31 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1187
(1986); David A. Stoney, Measurement of Fingerprint Individuality, in ADVANCES IN
FINGERPRINT TECHNOLOGY (Henry C. Lee & Robert E. Gaensslen eds., 2001).
106. See Scientific Status, supra note 102, at § 34:31, at 348-50.
107. Or is just beginning. See references supra note 103.
108. See United States v. Llera Plaza, 2002 W.L 27305, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
(Ashbaugh Testimony).
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corpse, and it is found to match one on file with a law enforce-
ment agency, doubts about the belief warrant for the identifica-
tion would seem trivial.
At the other extreme, however, it is clear that there is a
lower limit of certainty. If a glass found in a room where a mur-
der had been committed had a smudge on it which showed
clearly only one portion of one ridge one sixty-fourth of an inch
long (a very "partial" "latent print"), neither its curvature nor any
microscopic detail connected with it would allow a confident
identification. Since no one knows its orientation, or which digit
it came from, it would have to be compared with every short
length of every ridge on every print of a candidate card, and no
one knows exactly how many such short lengths of a ridge might
match it in any randomly selected ten-print card.
So in regard to the admissibility of fingerprint identification,
there would seem to be two potential issues of reliability, one triv-
ial and one extremely important. The first would challenge the
admissibility of any identification derived from fingerprint com-
parison, on the ground that without formal research and quanti-
fied statistical modeling, its reliability could not be established.
Such a challenge is puckish, quixotic, and in some ways construc-
tive, but in others not. °9 In the end, it is doomed to failure, and
not simply for the wrong reasons either. First, there has been
little empirical study that tends to indicate that, at least in regard
to large clear areas of ridged skin, variability is large and coinci-
dental matches are at least very rare. 110 Second, the extensive
use of ten-print comparisons for identification of unknown per-
sons followed by later confirmation of identity from other
sources and no known record of error can be said to form a prac-
tical accuracy feedback loop unique among forensic identifica-
109. Such positions can be used to paint all critics of forensic science as radi-
cal bomb-throwers and extremists deserving of small consideration. For a milder
and more nuanced, but still, in our view, much too global version of a similar
characterization, see Edward Imwinkelried, Flawed Expert Testimony: Striking the
Right Balance in Admissibility Standards, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2003, at 28 (asserting
critics demand unreasonable global exclusion, and apparently arguing for (to our
minds) unreasonably global admission).
110. The so called "50k x 50k study" testified to by Donald Ziesig of Lockheed
Martin Information Systems, which computer-compared each of 50,000 individual
rolled loop class prints from white males with each other, was perhaps such a
study, see Llera Plaza 1, 2002 WL 27305, at *3, but probably any such characteriza-
tion is wrong. It was really a test of the Automated Print Identification System
(AFIS) that assumed the individuality of prints rather than testing that hypothesis.
This study is referred to as S. B. Meagher, B. Budowle & D. Ziesig, 50k vs. 50k
Comparison Test (1999) (unpublished) in Stoney, Scientific Basis, supra note 98, at
258 n.3, § 34:35, and must be taken with something of a large grain of salt, since it
was FBI commissioned and still has never been published. Its many weaknesses are
discussed in Cole, supra note 44, at 1046-1047 n.334, and authorities there cited.
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tion techniques.1 1 1 While more defensible research is to be
encouraged, a global challenge to the reliability of all fingerprint
identification is a non-starter.
The second potential challenge is the important one. It is
based on the boundary problem described above: identification
of a practical threshold of reliability for "partial prints." What
standards should be applied to insure that identifications from a
small area of print found at a crime scene are sufficiently reliable
for purposes of the criminal law? Here, the absence of formal
data ought to be more troubling under Daubert and Kumho Tire.
This is especially true because fingerprint experts either disagree
on how to characterize the threshold of reliability, or more com-
monly, claim that such a threshold cannot be described at all." 2
This is the result of the addition to fingerprint examination over
the last decades of new sources of information (often now collec-
tively referred to under the title "ridgeology")" I 3 which makes old
thresholds fail in some circumstances." 14
Extensive clear prints such as ten-print cards might be
quickly matchable by general pattern at the first general level of
observation (sometimes called "the first level of analysis"), 115 and
111. See Scientific Status, supra note 102, at § 34:47, at 362-64 (discussing
whether fingerprint procedures have been empirically validated). Professor Cole
reports a single case of misattribution in a death case, but that involved the recov-
ery of a single latent thumb print from the badly decomposed corpse after "some
skin restoration using tissue builder." See Cole, supra note 44, at 1013.
112. See Scientific Status, supra note 102, at § 34:46, at 360-62; COLE, supra note
42, at 262-63.
113. "Ridgeology" as a term appears traceable to a 1983 pamphlet by David
Ashbough, a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, entitled
"Ridgeology." The specific detail to which he referred, such as the presence of
pores and characteristics of curvature, had been known and considered for some
time (the use of pores even has its own term, "poroscopy"), but Ashbough's radical
claim that identification was always a gestalt which could never be subject to any
threshold system of points (which had been foreshadowed by a resolution of the
International Association of Identification, the leading organization of fingerprint
examiners) was embraced by many. See COLE, supra note 42, at 261-66.
114. Or rather, which makes old thresholds overly conservative in the eyes of
some. See COLE, supra note 42, at 263.
115. Llera Plaza I, 2002 WL 27305, at *4-*5 (Ashbaugh testimony). This is all
part of what is now billed as the "ACE-V" methodology, a "methodology" so lacking
in methodological detail as to be, upon reflection, nearly hilarious. The A stands
for "assess," that is, look at a latent print and decide whether it is too smudged or
small even to try to analyze it, and whether any apparent detail ought to be ig-
nored because it represents a "double tapped" or overlapping print. The C stands
for "Comparison," and that means, well, the examiner is to compare the known
and the latent print, though there are apparently no fixed standards for perform-
ing such a comparison. Rather, it is based "on the training and experience of the
examiner." E stands for "evaluation." which means that the examiner decides if
the two are similar enough to declare that they are a match, without reference to
any particular notion of minimum points of correspondence, and V stands for
"validation," which is a non-blind checking of the first examiners work by a second
716 [Vol. 52: p. 679
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confirmed by correspondence of individual landmarks (often
called minutiae)116 at the next level of magnification (often
called the "second level of analysis").' 17 These landmarks were
the Galton 118 solution to the curvilinear nature of ridges, identi-
fications of characteristics which could serve as discrete units of
analysis, such as the point where one ridge divides into two
(often called a "bifurcation"), or the division of two ridges fol-
lowed by their closure again (a "lake"), etc.'1 9 The correspon-
dence of such landmarks, the number of ridges separating them,
and the relative direction and distance of their separation, are
the stuff of determining the "number of points of comparison"
between two prints. However, at yet higher magnification (re-
ferred to sometimes as "third level analysis"),120 a clear print will
show yet more supplementary information detail, including the
width and shoreline of individual stretches of ridge, and the pres-
ence of pores separated by variable distances. Herein lies the
rub. Traditional reliability thresholds typically required from
seven to sixteen landmark points of comparison, with no unex-
plained differences. 12 1 Adding the third level of magnification
means, according to most examiners, that fewer traditional
points are necessary in a clear print because the new detail can
make up for fewer landmarks in individual cases. 122 Why the
new details of ridgeology cannot simply be assimilated into the
"points of comparison" available to make up a conservative quan-
tified minimum is not completely clear. 123 Given the subjective
examiner. This is the "scientific technique" which the government in Llera Plaza
argued "met all four of the Daubert guidelines." Llera Plaza II, 188 F. Supp. 2d
549, 560 (2002). Judge Pollak found ACE-V not to be "scientific," but appears to
have taken it seriously as a "methodology." Id. at 561-569.
116. Traditionally (per Galton) the term "minutiae" (singular, "minutia") was
synonymous with "Galton points." See Stoney, Scientific Status, supra note 42, at
257-258; Cole, supra note 42, at 79-80. There may be a trend toward applying the
term to the even smaller "third level" detail. See Llera Plaza 1, 2002 WL 27305 at *2,
where, according to Judge Pollak, FBI Fingerprint Unit Chief Stephen Meagher
used the term in this way.
117. See Llera Plaza I, 2002 WL 27305, at *2.
118. Sir Francis Galton (1822-1911) was a British biostatistician, geneticist,
eugenicist and fingerprint pioneer. See COLE, supra note 42, at 80 (noting ridge
characteristics, also know as minutiae, ridge details, or Galton details).
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See Scientific Status, supra note 102, at § 34:34, at 352 (noting disagree-
ment concerning number of points to compare).
122. See id.
123. The argument seems to have two aspects. First, some landmarks, such as
a "trifurcation," are so rare that their presence even without much else might be
enough for confident identification; second, the process is claimed to be a subjec-
tive gestalt process which is not rationally subject to universal thresholds made up
of specified criteria. See id. (same). While the latter may actually describe what
examiners do, it would seem desirable to hold them to some sort of statable mini-
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nature of the evaluation at the boundary, the necessity, for the
purposes of the law, of a mandated threshold in some form
would seem most consistent with the policies of Daubert, Kumho
Tire, Rule 702, and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt in the criminal law. This is especially true because such
evaluations at the boundary are usually performed without any
masking protocols to prevent suggestion or expectation from af-
fecting the results, and without any line-up type foils which, in
this area, could be easily supplied. 12 4 However, again consistent
with Kumho Tire, such determinations of the appropriate reliabil-
ity threshold should be dealt with in cases which arguably present
specific examples of the boundary problem.
One might attempt to counter these claims that the threshold of relia-
bility has not been appropriately established by asserting that the experi-
ence of practitioners has shown the threshold's limits. This is, in fact, the
claim that is made for fingerprint identification, and in general it is the
claim that lies behind most experience-based translational systems. This is
a strong claim under some conditions, but, unfortunately, a weak claim
under the circumstances that usually occur in the forensic identification
disciplines (fingerprint, handwriting, visual hair comparison, bitemark,
toolmark, firearms, etc.).
In some experience-based areas, including those sometimes used by
various judges to illustrate the acceptability of non-science, experience-
based expertise, such a claim is reasonable. In activities such as beekeep-
ing, harbor piloting, auto repairing or plumbing, the empirics of ordinary
every-day practice give unambiguous feedback on correct and incorrect
applications.' 25 However, in the forensic identification disciplines this is
mum even at the cost of giving up the occasional accurate identification in court
(such information could of course still be used as an investigative lead). Not even
large quantified minimums are foolproof protection against misattribution; two of
the cases of misattribution collected by Professor Cole were declared by the exam-
iner to meet a 16-point threshold. See Cole supra note 44, at 1009 (detailing finger-
print misidentification case).
124. See Risinger et al., supra note 74, at 43.
125[L]et us continue to examine what kinds of information can yield a
proper belief warrant for a claim of experience-based methods or skills
beyond self-belief. There appear to be two main sources of such informa-
tion: practical success and scientific testing of claims. It should not be too
surprising that we believe that actual scientific testing of claims is episte-
mically privileged, and trumps all when it has been done and done prop-
erly. However, like epidemiology in the case of risk-increase causation in
toxic tort, such testing is expensive and difficult to do across the whole
range of claimed practical areas of expertise that are proffered in legal
proceedings. In the absence of high-quality testing, are there ever any
circumstances that can take its place and provide adequate belief war-
rants for the purposes of the law?
In regard to claimed expertise at determining specific facts, at any
rate, there would seem to be two necessary conditions for such a belief
warrant: first, that in the ordinary practice of the claimed methodology or
skill, there are objectively unmistakable right and wrong results in most
[Vol. 52: p. 679
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rarely the case, for reasons I and others have dealt with at length else-
where. Suffice it to say there is often no objective index of right and
wrong identification, only the decision of ajury to believe the testimony of
the expert. In such circumstances, the experts' belief in their own accu-
racy, or that of the members of the guild to which they belong, is not a
sufficient basis for inferring accuracy in fact.
This is where, of course, science comes in again, or should come in.
When a non-science claim of experience-based expertise cannot derive
sufficient support from the circumstances of its practice, it must be subject
to testing according to the appropriate standards for undertaking such
tests, which are those adopted by the enterprise of science, standards that
have been in part responsible for the demonstrated successes of that en-
terprise both in theory and in application. Indeed, until such testing is
done, it is of questionable rationality to allow testimony of experience-
based experts operating on the boundaries, especially when the context is
prosecution-proffered identification expertise in criminal cases.
This is not to say that all products of real science are sufficiently relia-
ble for use by the law, either in policy-making contexts or in litigation.
Sometimes it is clear that the certainty of results from what appears to be
proper science practice is being oversold or distorted, and the admission
of such results can easily be attributed to the inappropriate impact of the
cases of application, and second, that there is a generally inescapable
penalty for wrong results. Under these circumstances, it is at least tena-
ble, at any rate, to believe that humans may develop generally reliable
practical methods and skills. Though the practitioners may not be able to
give any useful account of the reasons for their success (being only what
would have been called in an earlier time "mere empiricks"), if all the law
cares about is the success of the methods and skills developed in such
circumstances, then the judgments of such cooks (or beekeepers, or
chicken sexers) may be proper candidates for admission into evidence.
Of course, clearly apparent right or wrong results, and unambiguous
feedback regarding success or failure, are only necessary conditions for a
belief warrant about experience-based methods or skills; they are not in
themselves always sufficient. There are other conditions which may rein-
force or undermine reliability even in the presence of such conditions,
and therefore affect both the tenability of belief warrants and the ques-
tion of admissibility under Rule 702... The emphasis in Kumho Tire is on
reliability of the expertise in the circumstances of the case. New Rule 702
requires that proffered expertise be the product "of reliable methods"...
[T]here is one enormous reliability-undermining condition which ap-
plies to all expertise, but most heavily distorts expertise which is experi-
ence-based and relies on human subjective judgment. I refer to so-called
"observer effects," particularly those which result from conditions giving
rise to expectation and suggestion from which the expert has not been
insulated by appropriate masking techniques. In addition, much re-
search indicates that the distortions resulting from such unmasked sug-
gestion and expectancy are reinforced significantly by the kind of team
identification and desire to win which are virtually inevitable in the adver-
sary process.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Testing of the reliability of skills which has been done in
settings without such variables (which would be the norm in the usual design of
such tests) cannot establish that the skills survive in the presence of the precursors
of such effects.
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mystique of science. However, one can easily err in the opposite direction
as well. One of the most important of Caudill and LaRue's points is that
judges who approach science from the heroic positivist perspective they
learned in high school or obtained from the popular media, may expect
too much of science, and tend to dismiss scientific knowledge as junk sim-
ply because it is uncertain. 126 In addition, such judges may lose sight of
the fact that the decision thresholds that are used by scientists to establish
consensus may not be the same as those that are proper for the uses to
which the law wishes to put the information. In particular, there is a dis-
connect between the high standards of science and the lower official stan-
dards of certainty which are supposed to control allocation of
responsibility in civil cases, a point courts have often (though not always)
overlooked in spite of its being pointed out repeatedly by the academic
community.127
So what can we say in general? In general, I believe we can say that
what we need in judging the admissibility of proffered expertise is an ap-
propriate belief warrant; that is, good reason to believe that the claimed
expertise, given its specific form and the methods and conditions of which
it is a product, is appropriately reliable in regard to the case-specific ques-
tion upon which it is proffered. With this in mind, we can generate a
series of questions about how to approach the reliability of expert claims
in litigation, independent of the classification of those claims as proceed-
ing from "science" or "non-science," as follows:
1. What is the case-specific target issue to which the expertise is
directed?
2. What is the case-specific claim of expertise?
3. What available information bears on a rational belief warrant
in regard to the reliability of this specific claim of expertise?
4. What is the appropriate standard of certainty for such a belief
warrant given the kind of case, the issue involved, the distribu-
tion of the burdens of production and persuasion in the case,
and the standard of proof involved in regard to the issue upon
which the expertise is proffered?
126. See CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 2, at 15-30 (discussing whether trial
judges are overly skeptical of scientific experts).
127. See, e.g., Denbeaux and Risinger, supra note 100, at 45-47. See generally
Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse Interests: The Impact of the
Supreme Court's Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 289 (2001); Neil B. Cohen, The Gatekeeping Role in Civil Litigation and
the Abdication of Legal Values in Favor of Scientific Values, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 943
(2003) ; Lucinda M. Findlay, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges
Are Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L.
REV. 335 (1999).
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In our contribution to the symposium, which forms the subject of
much of the discussion by Caudill and LaRue, 128 Professor Denbeaux and
I undertook in some detail to illustrate how each question should be ad-
dressed in the context of a clear "scientific evidence" proffer (utilizing a
hypothetical toxic tort case),129 and a case involving the proffer of experi-
ence-based expertise (the Kumho Tire case itself).' 3 0 It will be noted that
all of these questions except the third can be answered by the court with-
out reference to the boundary between scientific and non-scientific knowl-
edge. Thus, for both the initial taxonomic examination of the
128. See CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 2, at 49-83 (discussing and critiquing
the various papers presented at a symposium of which I was principle organizer).
The symposium was entitled Expert Admissibility: Keeping Gates, Goals, and Promises
and took place in February 2003. The resulting papers were later published in Vol.
33, No. 4 and Vol. 34, No. 1 of the SETON HALL LAW REVIEW.
129. See Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 100, at 34-48 (identifying task-spe-
cific reliability question for explicit products of science).
130. See id. at 48-60. I must here register a disagreement with Professor Mos-
teller, who has been very kind to me in his contribution to this symposium. He
examines the circumstances of the Kumho Tire opinion, and concludes that the
result might have been different if the case had arisen after the notorious Fire-
stone tire failure epidemic, since that would have underscored the need of plain-
tiffs for such expertise to "rule out" consumer abuse as the cause of a tire failure,
in order to place responsibility on the manufacturer. See Robert P. Mosteller, Find-
ing the Golden Mean with Daubert: An Elusive, Perhaps Impossible, Goa4 52 VILL. L.
REv. 723, 745 (2007). He concedes that Mr. Carlson, the expert, was an easy tar-
get, but believes Justice Breyer was much too positive that Carlson lacked the abil-
ity he claimed, and (agreeing with Justice Stevens) asserts that at the very least the
Court should have followed the normal course by remanding the case to the lower
court to perform the specific reliability analysis. Id. Since I have written in specific
disagreement with both points, I feel that I should note that disagreement here.
Last point first. For reasons I explained in Risinger, supra note 64, at 774-76, I
consider Justice Breyer's decision not to remand, but to do the analysis himself, a
masterful and necessary case of teaching by example. And, as Denbeaux and I
developed at length, it did not seem at the end of the day that there was in fact any
rational reason to believe that Carlson or anyone else on the planet could accu-
rately do what was claimed-accurately assign by visual inspection, even by a more-
likely-than-not standard, the cause of a tread separation in this very old and nearly
bald tire to the existence of a defect that was present when the tire left the factory
years before, rather than to cumulative (though perhaps sporadic) misuse over
the years of the tire's long life. See Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 100, at 48-60.
And though I generally believe that courts have often imposed epistemic standards
on plaintiffs under Daubert that were unreasonably high, I do not think that Kumho
Tire is one of those cases. Certainly, in many or most of the Firestone cases, the
tires would have been newer, and would have shown none of the "four factors" of
Carlson's test, rather than "some of each, but not enough of any two together,"
which was the part of his testimony he could not defend-both because it seemed
implausible and because it was not subject to any accuracy feedback in his experi-
ence. Second, in many of the Firestone cases, the tires often failed in the hands of
original owners who (assuming they survived the accident) could give testimony
concerning the way the tires were maintained. And even if no such testimony were
available, and the plaintiffs therefore "needed" the "expert" testimony, they
needed it in the sense of needing it to win, not in the sense of needing it to estab-
lish the factual likelihood of non-abuse. On the latter issue, there seems no reason
to say it is of any value at all.
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phenomenon of expertise, and for approaching most of the questions
dealing with expert admissibility in an individual case, the science/non-
science boundary problem is irrelevant. However, in evaluating the infor-
mation available on the existence of an appropriate belief warrant, the
science/non-science boundary must be addressed, because the nature of
evidence for belief warrants in the two domains is different. Thus, as the
title to this paper promised, the boundary issue is both irrelevant (to some
important issues of expert testimony) and centrally relevant (to the ques-
tion of how to establish a belief warrant in regard to a particular proffer).
44
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 4 [2007], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol52/iss4/1
